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 Abstract 
Industry plays a vital role in Tajikistan’s economic development. However, 
the long lasting transition from centrally planned economy to market based 
economy in the 1990s caused the country’s advanced industry to descend into 
deindustrialization. The membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
makes the situation even more complex for policy makers, as its regulations are 
reluctant to the use of industrial policies. 
The main objective of this study is to examine the causes of industrial 
prosperity in post war Japan and the “Four Asian Tigers”, as well as to derive 
some lessons for Tajikistan's industry from their experiences. Bearing this in mind, 
this study synthesizes three argumentative theories per se including Neoclassical, 
Statist and Institutionalist, which offer differing interpretations of formers' 
industrial success. To do this, the researcher employed a qualitative research 
method by conducting multiple case studies of Japan’s and the “Four Asian Tigers’ 
industrial experiences and Tajikistan’s industry while taking into account the 
WTO’s regulations. 
The study found that the emergence of the “Washington Consensus” and 
its augmentation, the triumph of the WTO over the General Agreement on Tarifs 
and Trade (GATT) and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 swept away the 
applicability of dirigisme and embedded autonomy to the East Asian success, but 
made the idea of laissez faire market more robust. Furthermore, the study has also 
revealed that Tajikistan’s political economy neither belongs to the analyzed 
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theories’ interpretations on the HPAEs’s but rather a mix of those interpretations 
and even beyond. 
Therefore, to make its objectives and reality meet at certain point, this 
study takes into consideration the prescriptions of the WTO’s industry related 
agreements, such as “Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights” (TRIPs), “Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures” 
(TRIMs), “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures” (SCMs) and 
“General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS). Hence, the study found that 
these agreements are the main causes of shrinking opportunity to employ 
industrial policies. The study concludes that although the space for maneuvering 
to employ industrial policies is narrowed down, it still exists, and that partial 
industrial development experience of the East Asian countries could be employed 
by Tajikistan. 
 Keywords: Industrial policy, East Asia, Tajikistan, WTO. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Over the second half of the twentieth century Japan and the so-called 
“Four Asian Tigers” (Hong-Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) have 
been enjoying extraordinary industrial and economic performance, unlike those 
comparable states in Latin America and Africa. Particularly from the 1960s to 
1980s, the economy of these high-performing Asian economies (hereafter - 
HPAEs) had been growing under 8 per cent annually. This deserved to be entitled 
“The East Asian Miracle”(World Bank, 1993; Wade, 2004). However, since the 
1980s, the causes of the miracle per se the extent of the state’s activity in 
economic life of these countries became subject of debates between mainstream 
views in economics.  
The Neoclassical economists claim that the HPAEs have followed the 
Anglo-American model of regulatory state where the market was unfettered and 
the state’s role was to adjust market’s failures. The Developmental States or so-
called “Statists” question the Neoclassicals by stressing that there was a dirigisme 
(state’s control over the economy) in the HPAEs and the states were imposing 
industrial policies upon the business. The Institutionalists argue that there was an 
institutional harmonization between the state and private sector, which mostly 
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leaned upon active role played by the Deliberation Councils. These councils 
served as platforms where both sides could benefit through consultation and 
sharing of information (Thompson, 1998; Chang, 1999; Natsuda, 2009). 
However, Weiss (2005) provides evidence that in the early 1990s the 
HPAEs reduced the state influence over the market by abolishing export subsidies, 
giving more emphasize on private sector and liberalizing financial sectors. By 
doing so, these ill-advised states had opened “Pandora’s Box”, or in a nutshell 
contributed to the “Asian Financial Crisis of 1997”. Meanwhile, the emergence of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 undermined “The East Asian 
Miracle”. In addition to these trends, Wade (2003) argues that currently the 
global economy is facing waves of regulations targeted at limiting the space for 
employing industrial policies particularly in developing countries. 
Undoubtedly, developing countries like Tajikistan are not exceptions from 
Wade’s argument. Since the independence in 1991, alongside with the four 
Central Asian countries, Tajikistan embarked on transition of its economy from 
“centrally planned economy” to “market based economy”. Since it embarked 
reforms under the World Bank’s and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
programs, the country had shifted to the track of the neoclassical model of 
economic development. For instance, the Government of Tajikistan (GoT) went 
on privatization and liberalization of its trade and financial regimes, modified the 
existing customs tariffs regime in line with the WTO recommendations (IMF, 
1999). 
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Nevertheless, apart from its neighboring countries Tajikistan had been 
facing severe political and economic crises. The civil conflict of the 1991-1997 
led to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to drop by 3 folds (32.6 per 
cent) in 1997 from its level in 1989. This caused to consider Tajikistan as the 
worst economic performer in the region. Besides, if we look through the sectoral 
economic performance of the four Central Asian countries we would find that 
during the first decade since independence Tajikistan has been the most 
economically disadvantaged state in the region (World Bank, 2013a). 
The country has a long history of industrialization. During the reign of the 
Bukhara Emirate in 1917 only two Tajiks per 10,000 had been involved in the 
small cotton processing industries. Yet subsequent engagement with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had brought massive industrialization into 
Tajik economy, which in the early 1991 led Tajikistan to be recognized by the 
United Nations as an industrialized state (Khokhlov, 2002). Unfortunately, 
contemporary Tajik industry is considered as an underdeveloped and it is still 
situated in transformational crises heading towards deindustrialization. Industrial 
crisis reached its critical point in 1997 wherein, according to the Agency on 
Statistics Under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan (ASUPRT), the 
industrial output rate and the number of sector’s employees respectively 
constituted 32.3 and 30.2 per cent of those of in 1991 (Khonaliev, 2009; ASUPRT, 
2011). 
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1.2 Problem of the Study 
Khokhlov (2002) emphasized that industry in Tajik economy plays a vital 
role. He correlates the importance to develop industry in Tajikistan with several 
reasons including: limited agricultural lands; the country’s mineral endowments; 
and high population growth rate (2.5 per cent annually). 
According to the GoT (2004), the collapse of the USSR had left serious 
problems to Tajikistan’s industry. Thereafter, the state had to define its own 
industrial development objectives using diametrically opposite methodologies to 
those of it used during the reign of the communist bloc. This was a chosen 
strategy of economic development based upon the neoclassical interpretation. 
Consequently, being cut off from socio-economically integrated system of the 
USSR and insufficient experience to perform well in recently established 
conditions, the country’s once advanced industry descended into 
deindustrialization path. 
As for the external challenges of Tajikistan’s industry, the researcher is 
inclined to consider the subsequent membership of the WTO and alignment to its 
requirements. This raises issues, such as competitiveness amongst participants of 
foreign economic activities, and boosting domestic industrial output. Wade (2003) 
argues that the WTO’s rules are very reluctant to the use of industrial policies; 
therefore, deriving viable implications from the HPAEs’ practices for Tajikistan 
discloses some considerable impediments.  
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1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 This study pursued the following objectives to: 
 Identify causes of industrial and economic development in the HPAEs; 
 Investigate what changes the WTO has brought into the world’s political 
economy; 
 Describe and analyze the current state of the economy as well as industry 
in Tajikistan;  
 Find out the space for policy intervention in order to implement the 
HPAEs' industrial development experience in Tajikistan’s economy. 
1.4 Research Questions 
To attain its objectives this study answers the following main research 
questions: 
 Why the HPAEs’ economic out-performance gained the title of miracle? 
 How the world of political economy has changed with the emergence of 
the WTO? 
 What is the current economic and industrial situation in Tajikistan? 
 How much space still exists beyond the WTO regulations in order to 
imply the HPAEs’ industrial experience into Tajikistan’s economy? 
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1.5 Significance of the Study 
There have been numerous studies focusing on the development of 
Tajikistan’s industry. Nonetheless, despite the country has undertaken the 
neoclassical path of economic development, almost all of the Tajik scholars, such 
as Umarov and Muhabatov (2011) and Khonaliev (2009) in their industry related 
researches have emphasized the government as the main protagonist in economic 
life of the country. 
 Thus, there neither been researches conducted on the development 
opportunities of Tajikistan’s industry within the WTO framework, nor on the 
implication of the HPAEs’ industrial development experience into the country’s 
economy. Therefore, this study contributes to the development of Tajikistan’s 
industry through implication of the HPAEs’ industrial development experience 
within the WTO framework. 
The results of this study put the fundamentals for the upcoming studies, 
thus it suits to development policy undertaken by the government. It could be also 
suggested to help the decision-making process of the government officials from 
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Ministry of Finance, Customs 
Service and National Bank of Tajikistan.  
1.6 Methodology 
This study employed an explanatory case study research strategy (Yin, 
2003). Therefore, it conducted multiple case studies of the HPAEs’ industrial 
experience through analysis of the Neoclassical, Developmental State and 
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Institutionalist theories. After synthesis of these theories, it derived viable lessons 
for Tajikistan’s industry within the WTO framework. The study used secondary 
data collected from different sources, such as government agencies of the 
Republic of Tajikistan, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO online databases, 
the internet and academic publications. In addition, the researcher has interviewed 
Tajik government officials
1
 for the purpose of determining the state’s industrial 
policy and its trends. 
1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 This study would mainly focus on the causes of industrial success in Japan 
and the “Four Asian Tigers”. Hopefully this understanding might provide some 
lessons for the development of Tajikistan’s industry. To make it more realistic this 
study has taken into account the WTO’s regulations in regards to the use of 
industrial policies. In view of the lack of research on Tajikistan’s industrialization 
this study aims to provide better understanding of the state’s role in the process of 
industrialization. 
The main limitation of this study was the inability to conduct face-to-face 
interview with representatives of both private enterprises and the state-owned 
enterprises in Tajikistan. This could provide prime evidence of costs and benefits 
of the WTO membership from the practical point of view, hence, may improve 
the analytical part of the research. 
                                                 
1
 The interviews were conducted in the form of telephone and email discussions with staff of the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan, Ministry of Finance 
of the Republic of Tajikistan and National Bank of Tajikistan. 
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1.8 Outline of the Thesis 
 The current chapter is a preview of the entire study and conveys the 
background information that identifies the topic, its significance and organization 
of this study. Chapter two identifies the causes of industrial and economic 
development in the HPAEs through analysis of the three argumentative theories. 
Chapter three provides chronic review of the neoclassical theory’s prosperity, 
which reflects more on widespread of the “Washington Consensus” and 
emergence of the WTO per se changes it brought to the developing nations. 
Chapter four explores the current situation of Tajikistan’s economy and its 
industry, and analyzes the similarities of both Tajikistan’s and the HPAEs’ state 
industrial policies. It also compares Tajikistan’s political economy with those of 
the HPAEs’ interpreted by the three theories. Chapter five analyzes the industrial 
standpoints of Tajikistan’s integration to the WTO from the TRIMs, GATS, 
SCMs and TRIPs perspectives and searches the loophole in their regulations in 
order to implicate the HPAEs’ industrial policies. The last chapter wraps up the 
study by making policy recommendations and suggestions for further studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. THE EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter provides the reader with clear comprehension on the role 
played by the HPAEs’ states in achieving their economic and industrial prosperity 
through comparison of the three controversial theories. 
2.1 Neoclassical Theory 
The neoclassical orthodoxy was derived from the studies of Alfred 
Marshal particularly the “Principles of Economics” published in 1890. It relies 
upon the analysis of short-run economic development and focuses on profit 
maximization through efficiently allocated recourses. In a nutshell, economic 
analysis is concentrated upon private sector’s decision-making and the role of the 
market forces rather than the states in the process of recourse allocation (Hunt, 
1989). 
The World Bank since its formation has been a fundamental anchor of this 
mainstream view and by recommending the trade liberalization policy 
theoretically adheres to this theory (World Bank, 1987). Hence in practice, during 
the 1980s and 1990s the Bank hand in hand with the IMF provided loans to 
developing countries with condition to adopt free market environment. This 
policy recommendation soon became known as the “Washington Consensus”. In 
1995 subsequent emergence of the WTO that became a push for developing 
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nations to undertake the course of trade liberalization, revealed that these 
organizations are the main adherents of the neoclassical theory (World Bank, 
1987; Wade, 1996; Thompson, 1998; Hamada, Otsuka, Ranis & Togo, 2011). 
In this model, the state’s role is relatively limited to catalyst and corrector 
of market failures. Occupying the centre stage are private entrepreneurs 
who respond eagerly to market stimuli, capitalizing on cheap, plentiful 
supplies of labour. This interpretation starts with a free trade regime, 
whereby national policy allocates resources in accordance with the 
country’s existing comparative advantage. (Chiu & Lui, 1998, pp. 138-9) 
The Bank had shown the HPAEs’ success as the best example of the 
neoclassical development model and argued that they had undertaken “right 
fundamentals” or “laissez-faire” policies. Consequently, these served to achieve 
the miraculous growth rate and equal income distribution (World Bank, 1987). 
The “right fundamentals” stand for “low inflation and competitive exchange rates, 
broadly based human capital development, effective and secure financial system, 
limited price distortions, the absorption of foreign technology, and a limited bias 
against agriculture” (Lee, 2002, p. 3). 
The states in the HPAEs except promoting steel and shipbuilding 
industries in South Korea and several considered industries in Taiwan had been 
providing up-to-date infrastructure, stable encouragement system, positive 
conditions for exporters by abolishing administrative barriers to exports. Besides, 
governments guaranteed that the bureaucracy will uphold exports rather than 
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harm. Only by these means states facilitated rapid economic development and 
nothing beyond (Balassa, 1988; Chiu & Lui, 1998). However, Kuznets (1988) 
compared the degree of the state’s interventions in Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan, and came to a different point from that of Balassa’s (1988). He stressed 
that in these states “government intervention, though restricted by the need to 
keep exports competitive, has been pervasive” (p. S36). In turn, the World Bank 
claimed that the locomotives of the HPAEs’ industrial revolution were the private 
enterprises and the states had a neutral role in these processes rather than 
“pervasive” (Chiu & Lui, 1998). 
Balassa (1988) attempted to justify “Applied Economic Policies” by 
comparing economic policies undertaken in Latin America and East Asia. Except 
Hong-Kong the rest of the HPAEs as well as the Latin American states applied 
the first stage of “import-substituting industrialization” (ISI) strategy whereby the 
states emphasized on the domestic market through substituting imports of non-
durable and “labor intensive” consumer goods2 with locally manufactured ones. 
However, according to the author once this stage of industrialization had 
been accomplished, the growth rate of manufacturing declined and could not 
surpass that of consumption anymore. Later, in the 1960s contrary to the Latin 
American states, which went through the second stage of the ISI wherein imports 
of durable or “capital-intensive” consumer goods3  were replaced by the local 
production, the HPAEs adopted “export-oriented industrialization” strategy that 
                                                 
2
 In this category Balassa (1988) included “clothing and textiles, shoes and leather, furniture and 
wood”(p. S282). 
3
 According to Balassa (1988) the concerned industries are chemical and steel etc. 
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provided an opportunity to overwhelm the limited capacity of their overfilled 
internal markets.  
Contrary to the ISI that comes up with “protectionism and monopolies” 
the export-oriented strategy equips the economy with capability to compete in the 
world market (Balassa, 1988; Jenkins, 1991; Chui & Lui, 1998). Balassa further 
determined four pillars of the HPAEs’ economic development as: “stability of the 
incentive system, limited administrative controls, laissez-faire labor and capital 
markets and reliance on private capital” (1988, pp. S286-7). The author states that 
all these four pillars had been controversial in the case of the Latin America, 
meaning that the states in this region were much pervasive. 
Applicability of the neoclassical model to the HPAEs’ industrialization, 
especially Balassa’s attribution lately went through the surge of criticism of 
economic scholars, such as Wade (1988; 1993; 2003). The opponent argued that 
Balassa conducted his study on the HPAEs based on weak methodology and 
drawing pictures of Korea and Taiwan as the states with liberalized trading 
systems was strongly misleading.  
Wade further argued that Balassa calculated the effective rate of protection 
by comparing the prices of the same consumer goods, which had been 
simultaneously produced locally and abroad. Balassa ignored that subsistence of 
tariffs and trade regulations make the local prices higher than those of external 
with free trade prices. Yet he preferred to compare prices directly, while in the 
1960s tariffs on imports and quantitative restrictions in Korea and Taiwan 
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accounted at average 60 and 74 per cent respectively (Chui & Lui, 1998, pp. 141-
2).  
Therefore, Wade (1993) underlined that Korean and Taiwanese trade 
systems with their bunch of quantitative and qualitative regulations cannot be 
qualified as laissez faire. Until the late 1980s almost all commercial banks in 
Korea and Taiwan were owned by the states. Here the author contrasts the 
neoclassical interpretation that the HPAEs had unfettered financial sectors. Given 
these advantages the state in Korea undertook industrial policies, such as 
allocation of the huge amount of policy loans to chaebols
4
. Those policy loans 
provided chaebols an opportunity to invest in new ventures and to diversify their 
production lines (Chui & Lui, 1998).  
White and Wade (1988) summed up that contrary to the neoclassical 
explanations, the HPAEs’ states had robust and more pick up interventions in the 
market than those of Latin American. 
2.2 Developmental State Theory 
 The Statist model is a fruit of debates on the vital preconditions for 
development, between the Neoclassical, Neomarxist and Dependency theorists. 
The latters questioned the dependent nature of developing nations and stressed 
that new socialist government agencies and smooth fundamental social 
                                                 
4
 Conglomerates or large business groups comprising of large companies in highly diversified 
business areas. According to The Economist (1996, p.58) the four biggest Korean chaebols are 
Hyundai, Samsung, LG and Daewoo which produced 80% of the country’s GDP or 60% of its 
exports.  
  14 
transformation are the vital preconditions for development (White & Wade, 1988). 
This intellectual debate took its historical roots from the argument that effective 
“late industrialization” shapes its form of development in a diametrically different 
manner from those of advanced economies (Gerschenkron, 1962). Chui and Lui 
(1998) stressed that contrary to the Neoclassicals, the Statists emphasized on the 
experience of “late industrialization” instead of squeezing maximum profits based 
upon comparative advantages. Hence, their perspectives are still suitable to 
Gerschenkron’s idea of “late industrialization”, which emphasized the state as the 
main protagonist guiding the market. 
Amsden (1989) also declared that the HPAEs’ industrialization has a 
character of “lateness” rather than “newness”. By this she theoretically adhered to 
the idea of Gerschenkron’s. She stated that in the HPAEs “industrialization has 
come about as a process of learning rather than generating inventions or 
innovations” (p. 4). Moreover, Wade (1992) claimed that the degree of obstacles 
faced by the latecomers raised an issue of developmental states to compensate the 
disadvantages faced by the HPAEs’ companies while competing with their 
foreign competitioners, as well as to maintain transformation of their industries 
towards more capital intensive technological productions. 
Chalmers Johnson invoked the concept of “Developmental State” while 
characterizing the role of the Japanese government played in the country’s 
unexpected economic enrichment (Johnson, 1999). This concept belongs to 
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neither Anglo-American nor Socialist models of the state’s role5 in the economy 
which rather goes beyond these two orthodoxies. Thus, in this theory the state 
guides the private enterprise’s decisions through pressure, encouragement and 
manipulation of their frontiers of decision-making (Johnson, 1987; Chui & Lui, 
1998). White and Wade (1988) adhered to Johnson’s explanation on 
“Developmental state”. They claimed that Taiwanese and Korean states are utterly 
diverging from those of the Socialist and Western paradigm, as the formers’ had 
given priorities to their industries by constraining market’s rationality.   
If we turn to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, among the most dramatic 
and equitable cases in the history of capitalist development, 
industrialization has in each case been accompanied by aggressive 
government intervention. The authorities have acted to guide markets and 
moderate the competitive process in a way that neo-classical economics 
says public officials cannot get right. (White & Wade, 1984, p. 1) 
Amsden (1989) asserted that every stage of industrial revolutions had 
certain degree of the state interventions. For instance, the state in the Great Britain 
– the mainland of “First Industrial Revolution” with laissez faire principles used 
to impose restrictions on technological outflow. The “Second Industrial 
Revolution” is associated with adoption of the strategy of “infant industry 
protection” in the United States and Germany. She continued that late 
industrializers have been specializing on practicing the dual strategies of 
                                                 
5
 Jonson (1987) contended, in the Anglo-American model of economy states are primarily 
controlling and have neutral role in the market operations, while the Socialist states attempt to 
replace bureaucracy for private sector and market mechanisms. 
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“subsidies” and “disciplines”. In the HPAEs subsidies distorted their relative 
domestic prices, and empowered the states “to decide what, when, and how much 
to produce which strategic industry to favour” (Amsden, 1989, pp. 8-12). 
However, in return according to Amsden the states in the HPAEs had been 
imposing “disciplines” over recipients of the their subsidies. For instance, in 
Korea “disciplines” served as “carrot and stick” by means of which government 
rewarded
6
 successful firms and penalized failed ones through holding back their 
licenses. 
Onis (1991) emphasized features associated with developmental states in 
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan as an unusual high degree of bureaucratic 
autonomy and public-private cooperation. The bureaucratic autonomy in the 
HPAEs, which had been organized based on meritocratic staff recruitment, gave 
space for governments to prevent corruption and identify their development 
targets independently (Onis, 1991; Weiss, 1995). Given the example of the Latin 
American states, Onis stated that lack of bureaucratic autonomy and public-
private cooperation leads to the elaboration of misleading set of national goals 
lying on private interests. According to Johnson (1987) bureaucratic autonomy 
had been highly protected in the HPAEs. Johnson stressed, “… the official 
bureaucracy does the actual planning, intervening, and guiding of the economy” 
(p. 152). 
Chui and Lui (1998) claimed that despite the popularity of the HPAEs’ 
                                                 
6Amsden (1989) referred to the extension of state bank’s loans, technical support, and introduction 
of foreign advanced technology through purchasing their licenses.  
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development model, they have limited applicability and validity of the Statist 
model. In drawing this model it is important to consider Bradford’s (1986) 
forewarning: “The real story of what constitutes successful development is more 
suitable and indeed quite different from what the stereotypes suggest” (p. 122).  
According to Chui and Lui (1998), the adherents of this model generalized 
the HPAEs’ cases and neglected to compare relative economic issues across the 
region. They excessively used the most evident cases to prove their theoretical 
opinion. In addition, the authors argued that Hong-Kong is most likely suitable to 
the Neoclassical model rather to Statist. This is evidently seen when its politicians 
are striving to work alongside the philosophy of “unfettered market” which 
warrant state’s non-intervention in the market.  
Singaporean state’s interference was not as much pervasive as it was in the 
other HPAEs. Chui and Lui asserted that government’s interference mainly had 
been concentrated upon labor market, fiscal incentives and providing 
infrastructure. Beyond these sectors government had no interest to interfere, even 
not capable to support financially the local manufacturers. However, with the 
purpose of determining the state’s responsibilities in the economic life of the 
HPAEs, the authors appealed to neglect both models and called for diversified 
analysis of their role. 
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2.3 State-business Interdependence Theory 
In raising the debates on the applicability of the Statist model, Gilbert and 
Howe (1991) argued that the Statists neglected the state-business interdependence 
and by acknowledging the state as an independent institution they missed the 
point of its relation to the society. The Statists underestimated societal power and 
disregarded possible class conflicts in the countries concerned. The authors 
claimed, “State and society are interdependent, and must be analyzed as such” (p. 
205). 
In vindication for such theory Weiss (1995) in her study on the HPAEs 
claimed that adherents of the Statist model more explicitly emphasized on the 
applied industrial policies and less implicitly on the government-business 
harmonized interactions.  
Therefore, Weiss called for the new explanatory theory known as 
“governed interdependence” (Appendix B1 shows its approach). Her theory 
proposes “that the ability of East Asian firms and industry more generally to 
adopt quickly to economic change is based on a system that socializes risk and 
thereby coordinates change across a broad array of organizations-both public 
and private” (p. 594). According to the author the proposed system mitigated the 
HPAEs’ firms from carrying whole burden of following risks related to: 
diversification of production lines and development of new technology; increasing 
capital; exploring new markets; and preparation of engineers, through sharing 
them with the related government institutions.  
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Weiss stated that the history is a testimony that pervasive governments 
were doubtful and improper in issues of managing their industrial sector. Hence, 
such models of state autonomy were lacking in important advantage, known as 
industrial “connectedness” or what Evans (1995) called “embeddedness”. Evans 
referred to the embedded autonomy as an existence of policy networks connecting 
public and private sectors. In Japan, Korea and Taiwan, relevant government 
institutions set up policy linkages to industrial sectors. These networks had been 
established on the basis of a vital mechanism, which enabled both parties to 
acquire valid information and consensually coordinate economic processes. 
Okimoto (1989) claims that only strengthened policy linkages between 
public and private sectors enabled Japanese government to practice industrial 
policy, which in turn led to economic prosperity. In Japan the “policy linkages” 
had been reflected in the form of 250 Deliberating councils or arranged forums for 
state-business consultations on major policies. Such councils empowered the 
government to consult and coordinate with private sector, which is rich in 
information related to industry (Johnson, 1985; Weiss, 1995).  
Although the HPAEs had similar policy linkages they had different 
business systems. In Japan this system was founded on the basis of  “keiretsu”7 
groups, in Korea on diversified chaebols and Taiwan on prosperous small and 
medium enterprises. Despite these wide diversities, the structures of their 
                                                 
7
 Keiretsu is business group or industrial conglomerate, comprises of diversified industrial firms 
based on cross-shareholding system and borrow from the same financial institution, which serves 
all group members. The six largest Japanese contemporary keiretsu are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, Funo, Sanwa and Ikkan. For more information refer to: Miyashita, K., & Russell, D. 
(1994). Keiretsu: Inside the hidden Japanese conglomerates (pp. 21-33). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
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industries had several common features that maintained connectedness with 
government. For instance, similar to Japanese Deliberation Councils, Taiwanese 
and Korean governments had established relevant committees comprised of 
government, academic and private sector representatives (Weiss, 1995). 
The moral of Weiss’s argument is that neither too much dirigiste state nor 
too much laissez faire market is effective in the long-run economic growth. The 
state-business interdependence model introduced by Weiss has come about to 
fulfill the shortcomings of the Developmental state model.  
However, her proposed model as an analytical approach has been seen as 
problematic (Chui & Lui, 1998). They argued that in Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
state-business relations had not been equally cooperative. Moreover, the balance 
of government and market power had been distributed irrationally across these 
countries. If Japan is the best example of Weiss’s theory, the same we cannot say 
about Korea, where according to Amsden the state had changed business 
behaviors for the sake of national interest. Besides, having post-war military 
regime of Kuomintang in Taiwan, cooperation with small and medium enterprises 
seemed problematic. Further, by questioning what are the conditions for state-
business cooperation, Chui and Lui argued that Weiss neglected to explain the 
possibility to raise bargaining, struggles and even conflicts of interests between 
public and private sectors during the negotiations. They concluded, “(t)heir 
interests may converge in certain countries, but diverge in others. Or public-
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private cooperation may be more possible in certain sectors within certain 
countries but not others” (1998, p. 153). 
Table 2.1 summarizes this chapter through comparison of the analyzed 
theories’ perceptions on the HPAE’s industrial development as a model. 
Table 2.1 
East Asian political economy: from the perspectives of the three theories (during the 
1950’s and 1990’s) 
Indicators Neoclassical theory Revisionists  
Developmental 
state theory 
Institutionalist theory 
Pervasive states No, rather correcting 
market failures 
Yes, the governments were strongly active 
in the market 
Laissez faire 
market 
Yes No 
hence: 
Economic 
decision-making 
was stressed on:  
Markets States’ capacity  Institutional networks 
comprising from both 
the state and business 
Resource 
allocation 
Markets decided, based 
on the countries’ 
comparative 
advantages 
States-led resource allocation 
Industrial policies Partially Yes 
hence: 
“Picking the 
winners 
strategies” 
Theory says, in market 
free economy such 
strategies are 
inconsistent 
States were practicing such strategies 
ISI strategies Recognizes that 
initially they employed 
this strategy 
Yes 
 
Export-oriented 
Industrialization 
Yes Yes 
Financial sectors 
were: 
Free of the states’ 
control 
Strictly under the states’ control (mostly in 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan) 
Trade was: Free, with no barriers Subject to quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions imposed by the states 
Note: Due to the space limitations there are some other indicators excluded.  
Source: Compiled by the researcher. 
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 The summary in the Table 2.1 demonstrates that the revisionists have 
explicitly shown the key industrial and economic indicators that were subject of 
the states control. Just because of the states’ efforts to make a cocktail from these 
components in an adequate amount led to the East Asian miracle.  
Nevertheless, despite this fact the HPAEs’ success as a potential 
development model have been further undermined by subsequent historical events, 
such as evolvement of the Washington Consensus, emergence of the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997, and triumph of the WTO over the GATT in 1995 
(Stiglitz, 1999; Rodrik, 2008). Therefore, the next chapter sheds light into the 
trends that made the neoclassical orthodox more robust and the outcomes these 
trends brought for the developing regions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. HOW THE WORLD HAS CHANGED WITH THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION? 
This chapter highlights the emergence of the WTO and what changes it 
brought for the developing world. For that, it will reflect a surge of neoliberal 
reforms occurred in the developing regions with the evolution of the Washington 
Consensus (WC). 
3.1 Evolvement of the Washington Consensus 
 The period of the 1970s up to 1980 was a period of remarkable economic 
prosperity in the Latin American region. However, the oil shocks of the 1970s had 
brought severe economic crisis into this region to which the states neglected to 
respond properly. Furthermore, eagerness of both, authorities to finance their 
balance of payment (BoP) and budget deficits, and foreign investors mostly from 
oil exporter countries to invest their petrodollars into this region worsened the 
situation (Hartlyn & Morley, 1986). Stiglitz (1999) claimed that the turning point 
for the crisis occurred when the real interest rates had risen in the United States. 
This made the entire region heavily indebted and incapable to serve its increased 
interest payments.  
 John Williamson (2004a) who pioneered the phrase “Washington 
Consensus” in 1989 asserted that his set of ten policy prescriptions was the most 
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desirable in the Latin America to overcome the crisis. Most importantly he stated 
that the WC was not only his, but also was a “Washington” of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, the White House, the U.S. Treasury, the Bretton Woods system 
and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and economic think tanks 
(Williamson, 1990). Nevertheless, Williamson (2009) claimed that many 
misleading opponents of the WC have been testifying that these prescriptions had 
come about to sweep aside the old economic development strategies prevailed in 
the region, per se the dirigisme based on Marxist interpretation.  
Gay (2007) inclined to believe that initially Williamson had been asserting 
that his “consensus” should be applied in whole developing world at all times. 
However, in his subsequent publications Williamson gradually has been changing 
his stance. In fact, he denied his claim by arguing that the WC had been designed 
just for the Latin America, but the Bretton Woods Institutions and their adherents 
had extended its applicability to the rest of developing countries all over the world 
(Williamson, 2009). In any case, whether Williamson has changed his stance or 
not, with lesser reference to him, his “consensus” became an absolute roadmap 
for global policymaking advocated by the IMF and the World Bank. For instance, 
throughout the 1990s the WC was mainly propagated across developing countries 
by these financial institutions using their conditional loans as a chief leverage. 
The original ten structural adjustment programs proposed: cutting off the 
budget deficits that led to balance of payments deficits; reducing and redirecting 
public expenditures from pro-growth to pro-poor; conducting tax reforms; 
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liberalizing the exchange rate and financial markets; reducing customs tariffs; 
establishing favorable conditions for the attraction of foreign direct investment 
(FDI); privatizing the state assets for the advantage of private entrepreneurship; 
and providing fair competition (Williamson, 2009). 
Meanwhile, Dani Rodrik (2008) challenged the Neoclassical orthodox by 
revealing “The Augmented Washington Consensus”. According to the author, the 
“augmented consensus” (see Table 3.1) underlies institutional nature, which is 
maintained by the neoclassical adherents whose belief is that bringing democracy 
through institutional building is a core for economic prosperity. 
Table 3.1 
The Augmented Washington Consensus 
Original Washington Consensus Augmented Washington Consensus (+10) 
1. Fiscal discipline 11. Corporate governance 
2. Reorientation of public expenditures 12. Anti-corruption 
3. Tax reform 13. Flexible labor markets 
4. Financial liberalization 14. WTO agreements 
5. Unified and competitive exchange 
rates 
15. Financial codes and standards 
6. Trade liberalization 16. “Prudent” capital-account opening 
7. Openness to DFI 17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
8. Privatization 18. Independent central banks/inflation 
targeting 
9. Deregulation 19. Social safety nets 
10. Secure Property Rights 20. Targeted poverty reduction 
Source: Adapted from Rodrik (2008, p. 17). 
Rodrik contrasted Williamson by arguing that both original and augmented 
consensuses have a neoliberal agenda, and through demonstrating the HPAEs’ 
success he further urged that well functioning institutions do not require reforms. 
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In a nutshell, it can be described in the following famous quotation: “It does not 
matter what color has a cat, as long as it catches the mice”8.  
Speaking of the HPAEs, Stiglitz (1999) claimed that before the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997 their model of economic development had been a symbol 
of motivation for the rests to act beyond the WC. Further, he found out that 
although the HPAEs had managed to not implement the WC’s prescriptions, their 
low inflation and fiscal prudence policies were absolutely aligned with those 
prescriptions. In light of reducing government existence in the markets advocated 
by WC’s adherents, Stiglitz argued that the real estate bubble in Thailand was not 
caused by the government’s eagerness to invest into it; it was caused by the lack 
of government control to halt the flow of investments. Moreover, he brought 
Korea as an example, where its government underestimated the vitality of the 
financial sector and corporate governance. Consequently, this led to the 
misallocation of the credits and subsidies. The author concluded that the WC had 
no solution for the Asian Financial Crisis. 
As we have found in Rodrik (2008) the need to establish the WTO as an 
organization that will be advocating trade without barriers has taken its core from 
the augmented WC. Therefore, in the coming section the researcher sheds light to 
the issues concerning the WTO per se how it emerged and how much space it left 
for developing countries to develop their industries. 
 
                                                 
8
 This was a famous quotation of Deng Xiaoping, the former Chinese leader (1904-1997). 
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3.2 Emergence of the World Trade Organization: is there any space for 
industrial development? 
“The world is experiencing a surge of international regulations aimed at 
limiting the development policy options of developing country governments” 
(Wade, 2003, p. 1). According to the author, the policy options became more 
limited with accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations (1986-1994), wherein the GATT members agreed to establish the 
WTO. In itself, the WTO had integrated a set of decisive agreements, which 
hitherto have expanded the scope of its responsibilities beyond the traditional 
reduction of tariffs on trade. 
Amongst those agreements, the WTO has four major agreements that seem 
innocent at first blush. They are: “Trade – Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights”– TRIPs; “Agreement on Trade – Related Investment 
Measures”– TRIMs; “General Agreement on Trade in Services” – GATS; 
“Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures” – SCMs (Natsuda & 
Thoburn, 2014, pp. 1-2). 
The TRIPs – have come about to protect intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
that are subject to international trade. These include copyrights; trademarks, 
geographical indications; industrial designs; patents and trade secrets (Correa, 
2000). According to Wade (2003), patents and copyrights are the most menacing. 
For instance, although many countries issue patents with lesser due date, the 
TRIPs obliges the WTO members to employ a minimum standard for IPRs 
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protection with period of 20 years for patents. Furthermore, it limits the 
government’s ability to utilize patented product or technology. 
Regarding technology, its transfer from developed to developing countries 
become a subject to academic dispute between economic think tanks. The TRIPs 
defenders asserted that sound legal protection of IPRs would increase the inflow 
of FDI, which in turn might cause technology transfer and develop innovation 
activities in developing countries (Correa, 2001). However, those who have taken 
the opposite side of dispute argued that the gap of technological advancement 
between developed and developing countries has been increasing since the 
adoption of the agreement. According to Sachs (1999), the North’s9 attempts to 
cut off piracy on IPRs through TRIPs had slowed down the technology transfer so 
that the poor nations are being ripped off from the intellectual rally. Thus, he calls 
for some sort of equity to be embedded into the agreement. 
If we size up the development experience of once developing and 
presently developed countries like the USA, European countries, Japan and let us 
include the rest of the HPAEs
10
, then we could easily recall the assessment made 
by Gerschenkron (1962) and Amsden (1989) that these “latecomer” states 
advanced their industries through technology borrowing behavior, rather for their 
inventiveness. To sum, whether the TRIPs shares with tidbit of industrial 
                                                 
9
 The author here refers to the developed countries in particular the USA. 
10
 Although, some of the HPAEs do not possess a status of developed country, they have 
experienced tremendous socio-economic development after the World War II, as it has been 
proved in the previous chapter.  
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development with developing countries or not, we would like to quote Natsuda 
and Thoburn (2014): 
Under the WTO regime current developing countries cannot pursue the 
same policies as the current developed countries and East Asian countries 
did in the past, because the TRIPs limit developing countries’ access to 
technology and knowledge. In other words, the policy space for such 
technology policies has been shrunk, and the ladder up towards 
development has partly been kicked away. (pp. 4-5) 
TRIMs – designed with purpose to ban “performance requirements” 
imposed on foreign companies in host country, which negatively affect trade 
flows. They include requirements on local content, exports barriers, local 
manufacturing, technology transfer, trade balancing, foreign exchange 
requirements and domestic production mandates (Lawrence, 1997). The author 
claimed that adoption of the TRIMs established a fairly competitive environment 
for attracting FDI among developing countries and its inflow has been increasing 
in recent years.  
However, Wade (2003) argued that the TRIMs is more dangerous than the 
TRIPs, because they reduce development options of developing countries, as they 
occupy broader scopes of an economy and operate based on non-discrimination 
principles. Furthermore, the TRIMs’ supporters refer to some clauses of the 
agreement that provides “special and differential treatment” to developing 
countries in terms of “time period” for smooth complying. Wade argued that 
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“time period” has nothing to do with the protection of infant industry; rather it 
has been provided for aligning legislative framework with the TRIMs 
requirements. Wade (2003) concluded that“(i)n this fundamental respect the 
TRIMS agreement narrows the scope of ‘special and differential treatment’ 
allowable for developing countries, compared to the scope pre-TRIMS” (p. 7). 
GATS – disciplines and obligations apply to all kind of government 
intervention at all levels of governments, even to those non-governmental 
companies experiencing governmental support. Thus, the WTO members are 
required to bring their legal frameworks aligned with the GATS requirements 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2003). 
According to Wade (2003), this agreement has extended the WTO’s scope 
of regulations from trading in goods to trading in services. Here, by trade in 
services the GATS refers to investments in social sphere services (education and 
health distribution); banking; waste utilization; tourism and water supply and 
sanitation. Therefore this agreement could be considered as an investment 
agreement (Wade, 2003; Natsuda & Thoburn, 2013).  
The concept of “trade in services” itself, defined in Article I:2 of the 
GATS as providing services within four “modes of supply” (see Table 3.2) 
(UNCTAD, 2003). 
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Table 3.2 
Four modes of service supply 
1. Cross-border This mode involves supply of a service across the border from the 
territory of one Member into the territory of another Member 
2. Consumption 
abroad 
It deals with the situation where the consumer of a service travels to 
the territory of another Member in order to consume the services 
3. Commercial 
presence 
The supply of services under this mode requires that the service 
provider of a Member has established a commercial presence in the 
territory of another Member  
4. Movement of 
natural 
persons 
This is where a service provider of one Member travels to the 
territory of another Member in order to supply the service 
Source: UNCTAD (2003, pp. 13-28). Compiled by the researcher. 
Further, the scopes of the GATS’ responsibilities become broader, as it 
requires “most favored nation (MFN) treatment” that obliges the host 
governments to treat all companies from all of the WTO member countries 
operating within their territories equally. In addition, the GATS obliges “national 
treatment” that requires host government to treat both domestic and foreign (as 
long as they are from member countries) companies equivalently at the same level 
(UNCTAD, 2003, pp. 13-28). 
The GATS adherents assert that fair trade in services within the GATS’ 
regulations will increase the inflow of FDI in the form of technology and its 
diffusion, which in turn will accelerate economic development in developing 
WTO members (Walraven, 2006). 
However, a study conducted by the UNCTAD disproved this stance of the 
GATS’ supporters; it claims: “There is no empirical evidence to link any 
significant increase in FDI flows to developing countries with the conclusion of 
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GATS” (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 172). Moreover, Wade (2003) argued that the GATS 
massively narrow down the space for government’s policy intervention aimed to 
improve technological base of local industries. To sum up with the impact of the 
GATS on development in developing WTO members we would refer to Natsuda 
and Thoburn (2013): “In this context, the GATS agreement diminishes the 
development policy space in developing countries” (p. 5). 
SCMs – crafted to diminish governmental export promotion incentives and 
to prohibit application of once famous ISI policy. Article 1 of the SCMs applies 
multilateral disciplines and prohibition of subsidies that are specific and not 
necessarily related to services, but to goods. Now, if a member government 
employs an income support or financial contribution (in the form of: grants and 
loan guarantee, corporate income tax exemptions, government procurement, 
providing goods and services) to a specific industrial company, then it would be 
treated as a subject to the SCMs disciplines. 
By “specific” here, the agreement implies to the targeted support of a 
government to certain enterprises or to a particular branch of its industry (for 
instance, steel or textile industries). In turn, under the SCMs the subsidies are 
categorized into two groups. First, “prohibited subsidies” prescribed in the 
Article 3 of the SCMs, which prohibits government subsidies directed to export 
promotion and import substitution subsidies (International Trade Center, 2009). 
Nevertheless, Natsuda and Thoburn (2013) assert that there is a demarcation line 
that determines categories of developing countries having per capita income 
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below US$1,000 which are subject to exemption from this prohibition. The 
second is “actionable subsidies”. It covers the rest of subsides that do not 
necessarily fall under “prohibited subsidies”, but could possibly cause “adverse 
effects” on the interests of the rest of the WTO members. According to the 
authors there are three types of “adverse effects”:“i) damage to domestic industry 
in importing countries, ii) serious prejudice as a result of adverse effect in a third 
country market, iii) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under GATT 
1994” (p. 6). 
3.3 What are the Development Options for Developing Countries Left 
Beyond the WTO Regime? 
Throughout the previous chapter we have been witnessing that the HPAEs 
have achieved their tremendous economic prosperity due to the implementation of 
industrial policies. Therefore, in this section our main objective is to find out 
whether today’s developing countries still have the opportunity to employ those 
industrial policies within the WTO regime or not. 
Lee and Han (2006) argued that in the age of the WTO the states are more 
disempowered and alignment to the WTO regime has swept away the opportunity 
to employ the East Asian developmental state model. However, some of the WTO 
opponents such as Amsden (2001; 2003), Rodrick (2004), Shafaeddin (2006) and 
Natsuda and Thoburn (2014) asserted that although it is shrinking, the developing 
nations still have plenty of room for maneuvering to implement industrial policies 
within the WTO framework. 
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For instance, Amsden (2003) mentioned the “specific non-actionable 
subsidies” pointed out earlier, as well as the following: employing of indirect 
export requirement through “trade-balancing”, and development of technological 
based economy through investing in “technological parks.” Furthermore, she 
called for “getting the control mechanism right” in order to stimulate and guide 
the private enterprises in particular direction. The essence of her argument is that 
no matter what instruments of promotion, they“...must be tied to monitorable 
performance standard and operate within a reciprocal control mechanism that 
disciplines all parties involved in industrial expansion” (Amsden, 2003, p. 95). 
According to UNCTAD (2006) unless the WTO member government does 
not violate the national treatment it is allowed to impose measures regulating FDI. 
Such measures could be an obligation on foreign firms to transfer or license a 
certain technology to the domestic firms or conduct R&D locally. Moreover, it 
also enables host government to require investors to hire their technology staff 
locally (Shadlen, 2005). 
Furthermore, Shafaeddin (2006) asserted that developing countries have 
the only opportunity to promote indirect exports. That is to set up export activities 
in their disadvantaged regions, which allow them to benefit from “non-specific 
subsidies” offered to the industries in those regions. Speaking of disadvantaged 
regions, China, for the sake of its poor regions provided tax holydays for the 
foreign investors investing in there (UNCTAD, 2006). This method is also 
consistent with the WTO regime, which gives the host government an opportunity 
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to take control over foreign participants. To wrap up this section we would like to 
quote Natsuda and Thoburn (2014): 
… the WTO rules still allow developing governments to select strategic 
industries or particular operations and functions (such as R&D, human 
resource development, regional headquarters) for industrial development. 
This can be still done by employing discretionary power in providing 
subsidies or positive tax incentives. (p. 7) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL STATE OF TAJIKISTAN 
This chapter sheds light into Tajikistan’s macroeconomic situation as well 
as patterns of its industrial development, which encompasses issues, such as 
overall indusrial location, its structural changes and challenges. It also assesses 
the GoT’s industrial policy and seeks to find out for similarities to those of the 
HPAEs’. The chapter concludes with analysis of Tajikistan’s political economy 
from those of the Neoclassical and Revisionist’s perspectives. 
4.1 Country Context 
Republic of Tajikistan is a former Soviet Union country that gained its 
independence on 9
th
 of September 1991. It is a Central Asian landlocked 
developing country that is geographically located two thousand kilometers far-off 
from the closest port. This makes it the least accessible country in the globe 
(World Bank, 2010). Within 22 years of independence, the country has been 
experiencing several political changes including the civil conflict that lasted for 
five years until the “Peace Treaty” between the government and opposition has 
been undersigned in 1997. For the administrative purposes, the country is divided 
into four provinces: Sughd, Khatlon, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region 
(GBAO) and regions of republican subordination (RRS). 
Tajikistan has 527,000 GWh/year hydro potential that is considered the 
second in the region after the Russia Federation and the fifth in the world 
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(Kayumov, 2010). Potentially, the abundance of water resources makes 
production of ecologically pure energy one of the comparative advantages of the 
country alongside production of cotton and aluminum. Unfortunately, despite a 
number of recently launched large and small hydropower stations, the country is 
harnessing only 6 per cent of its feasible hydro potential (World Energy Council, 
2007). 
In 2013 Tajikistan announced the birth of its eight millionth citizen (see 
Appendix A1). The growing tendency of its population (2.45 per cent) annually 
brings about 150,000 additional workforces into the economy with 2.4 per cent 
unemployment rate per annum (ASUPRT, 2012). Abundance of labor force in the 
country caused net migration rate to increase to -8.15. Moreover, in 2011, the 
country has been ranked as the first among ten top recipient countries of migrant 
remittances (see Figure 4.1) (UNFPA, 2012). 
      
Figure 4.1. Top ten recipients of migrant remittances as share of GDP (2011).  
Source: World Bank (2013b, p. 5). The Migration Development Brief. 
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In 1999, as a consequence of the civil conflict and the collapse of the 
socio-economically integrated system of the USSR, the country’s net population 
income declined sharply; living standards fallen to the levels associated with those 
of least-developed countries; and 81 per cent of the population fallen below the 
poverty line (see Appendix B2). However, according to the “Living Standard 
Improvement Strategy of Tajikistan” (LSIST) due to expansion of the socio-
economic reforms, maintenance of macroeconomic stability, support of the 
international community and particularly remittances of the labor migrants (see 
Figure 4.2), the poverty rate has shrunk to 38.3 per cent in 2012 (LSIST, 2013). 
 
Figure 4.2. Tajikistan’s migrant remittances as percentage of GDP. 
Source: World Bank (2013a). Compiled by the researcher. 
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4.2 Macroeconomic Stability 
Along with the rest of the four Central Asian countries, Tajikistan in 1994 
embarked on the transition of its economic system from “centrally planned 
economy” to “market based economy” (Latifov, 2006). However, apart from its 
neighbors Tajikistan had been facing severe political and economic crises. As a 
result of the civil conflict, the country’s GDP in 1997 dropped 3 folds (32.6 per 
cent) from its level in 1989 (see Figure 4.3), which caused to consider Tajikistan 
as the worst economic performer in the region.  
 
Figure 4.3 GDP changes in the CIS countries (1989=100) 
Source: Pomfret (2003, p. 16). 
Latifov (2006) claims that vast implementation of reformative sectoral 
programs had placed most significant impact on Tajikistan’s economic growth. 
These programs provided an opportunity to engage international community and 
abandon the long-lasting economic recession in 1997. In fact, since 1997 as it is 
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apparent in the Figure 4.4, the country has been enjoying a stable economic 
growth averaged at 8 per cent annually. 
 
Figure 4.4 Tajikistan’s GDP growth rate (annual %) 
Source: World Bank (2013a). Compiled by the researcher. 
According to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan 
(MFRT) as of 2000, the country’s multilateral and bilateral debt had been 
accounted to 100 per cent of its GDP. However, due to its concessional character 
and substantial debt write-off initiatives of its bilateral partners, the government 
was able to manage the debt ratio at 28.5 per cent of the GDP in 2012. Currently, 
the country’s external debt comprises of 43 per cent of multilateral and 47 per 
cent of bilateral loans, making the World Bank and China the largest multilateral 
and bilateral donors, respectively (MFRT, 2013).  
Country’s independent monetary institution had been set up along with 
-7,1 
-29 
-16,7 
1,7 
11 
3,9 
8 
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
  41 
establishment of the National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT) in 1991. Until 2000, 
Tajikistan had changed its national currency several times. The current 
functioning national currency is “Somoni” (TJS) (President of Tajikistan, 2013) 
and the US dollar is commonly accepted currency in the country’s foreign trade 
operations. To overcome country’s negative trade balance (see Table 4.1) as a 
main tool the NBT has set out the free fluctuated managed exchange rate 
(TJS/USD). The trends of the foreign exchange rate fluctuation demonstrated in 
Appendix B3 show that TJS is depreciating since its implementation. Hopefully, 
having such trend is much favorable for the encouragement of the exports. 
Table 4.1 
Tajikistan’s foreign trade turnover (current USD, billion) 
Indicator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Import 1.22 1.61 2.55 3.7 2.71 2.96 4.38 4.91 
Export 0.6 0.65 0.76 0.86 0.75 0.86 1.16 1.39 
Trade balance -0.61 -0.96 -1.78 -2.83 -1.95 -2.1 -3.21 -3.52 
Source: World Bank (2013a). Compiled by the researcher. 
According to the World Bank (2013a) in 2012 country’s foreign trade 
turnover amounted USD 6.3 billion (current USD). Compared to 2005 this 
indicator has increased to 28.8 per cent in 2012. Despite this, the balance of trade 
turnover as apparent in Table 4.1 developed negatively and its deficiency 
amounted to over USD 2.4 billion or 24 per cent in comparison with 2011. 
Moreover, since the last decade the country has been possessing surplus budget 
balance averaged at 0.89 per cent annually and due to its prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies, the inflation rate dropped from 38 per cent in 2001 to 6.4 per 
cent in 2012 (NBT, 2013a; NBT, 2013b). 
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Based on the data retrieved from the World Bank (2013b) the researcher 
divided the sectoral economic performance of the four Central Asian countries 
into two decades (see Table 4.2). The first has been entitled as the lost decade 
encompasses periods of 1990 to 2000. The second as a decade of recovery 
encompasses periods of 2000 to 2010. 
Table 4.2  
Average percentage of the GDP growth (breakdown by sectors) of the four Central Asian 
states for the period of 1990-2000 (I) and 2000-2010 (II) 
Name of 
country 
GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
I II I II I II I II I II 
Kyrgyzstan -4.1 4.6 1.5 1.8 -10.3 0.8 -7.5 -1.2 -5.2 7.9 
Tajikistan  -10.4 8.2 -6.8 7.7 -11.4 9.2 -12.6 8.6 -10.8 8.3 
Turkmenistan -4.9 13.9 -4.7 14.3 -2.7 30.3 - - -5.8 16 
Uzbekistan  -0.2 6.9 0.5 6.5 -3.4 4.7 0.7 2.3 0.4 8.5 
Source: World Bank (2013a). Compiled by the researcher. 
Table 4.2 additionally confirms that during the first decade since 
independence due to known reasons Tajikistan had been the most economically 
disadvantaged country in the region. Analysis of the current composition of the 
country’s GDP (see Table 4.3) shows that the service sector is dominating over 
the rest of the indicators making up 50 per cent of its GDP. Ironically, since 1991, 
agricultural and industrial sectors have equally dropped their shares in the 
country’s GDP for almost two folds, each making up 25 per cent of the country’s 
GDP in 2012. 
Table 4.3 
Structural development of the Tajikistan’s economy 2000-2012 (value added % of GDP) 
Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agriculture 24.7 27.1 21.6 24 24.2 22.2 22.7 22.1 21.2 26.7 25.6 
Industry 39.4 37.4 35.4 31.3 31.1 30.5 28.3 24.5 23.4 22.1 25 
Manufacture 34.2 31.3 24.3 23.7 22.2 18.8 14.4 12.5 9.5 8.3 7.2 
Services 35.9 35.5 43 44.8 44.7 47.3 48.9 54.4 55.4 51.3 49.4 
Source: World Bank (2013a). Compiled by the researcher. 
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4.3 Tajikistan Industry 
 Before the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1924, Tajikistan inherited 
absolutely weak industry from the Bukhara Emirate. It had been recorded that in 
1917 during the reign of Bukhara Emirate 85 per cent of Tajiks were involved 
into agricultural sector and only two people per 10,000 populations had been 
engaged in the small cotton processing industry. Moreover, due to its closeness to 
the capital of Bukhara all enterprises were established in the northern part of 
Tajikistan and the rest of the country had relatively no trace of industry at all 
(Umarov & Muhabbatov, 2011). The authors claim that the membership to the 
USSR had somehow brought no substantial changes at all, but only shifted from 
one system of governance to another. Tajikistan also served as the appendage of 
the comparably advanced economy through supply of the raw agricultural 
products to the industrial center. 
According to Khonaliev’s (2009) periodization of industrial development, 
Tajikistan went through three stages of industrialization. The first, covers period 
of 1924-1940 known as the period of prioritized development of light and food 
industries based on utilization of local agricultural products. The second, known 
as the period of formation and development of multisectoral and mainly heavy 
industries, covers period of 1941-1971. In 1970 as compared with 1940 the gross 
industrial product increased 10 folds, including: electricity 92 folds; engineering 
and metallurgy 63 folds; and construction materials industry 44 folds. The third 
period was the stage of advanced development of metallurgy, chemical, 
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hydropower and energy-intensive industries, which started in 1971 and ended up 
with liquidation of centrally planned economy and the collapse of the communist 
bloc in 1990. Khokhlov (2002) asserts that the period of 1990 was the culminating 
period for the Tajikistan’s industry. This caused the United Nations to recognize 
Tajikistan as an industrially advanced state.  
Contemporary Tajik industry is considered as an underdeveloped and still 
situated in transformational crises heading towards deindustrialization. Industrial 
crisis reached its critical point in 1997 wherein industrial output rate constituted 
32.3 per cent of that of in 1991, including: construction material industry 2.3 per 
cent; woodworking 4.7 per cent; fuel 8.8 per cent; chemical and petrochemical 
13.5 per cent; food 14.8 per cent; engineering 13.7 per cent; light 32 per cent; 
metallurgy 39.6 per cent. Moreover, in 2010 there were engaged 69.5 thousand 
employees in industrial sector, which constitutes 30.2 per cent of that of in 1991 
(Khonaliev, 2009; ASUPRT, 2011).  
In 2012, the diversity of the country’s main industrial products reached to 
90 (Appendix A2 shows main industrial products) and the total industrial value 
added increased to 665.4 per cent and 172 per cent from that of in 1997 and 1991, 
respectively (World Bank, 2013a). However, Khonaliev (2009) claims that the 
process of industrial recovery in Tajikistan was not followed by: mass renewal of 
capital stock; replacement of obsolete and worn out equipment and technology
11
 
with modern and advanced ones; and even without the absorption of abundant 
                                                 
11
 Khonaliev (2009) states that currently nearly 90 per cent of the country’s industrial equipment 
and technology are outdated. 
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labor. Appendix A2 reveals that more than half of the main industrial products of 
the country belong to the light industry, and that is processing agricultural 
products. Though in fewer amounts, Tajikistan used to assemble vehicles for civic 
transportation, but due to the sector’s low competitiveness its production has been 
abandoned. Moreover, the amount of the produced oil and gas is insufficient to 
meet the needs of the economy. 
4.3.1 Industrial location in the country and its structural changes during the 
independence 
The level of industrial development in the provinces, as well as 
countrywide is in rock bottom. The huge differences between industrial decline 
rate of 1991-1997 and its growth rate during the 1998-2011 have been recorded 
not only on national level, but on provinces as well. Comparably, sharp decline of 
industrial output took place in Dushanbe, wherein the share of which in the 
country’s gross industrial output shrank from 25.9 per cent in 1990 to 11.6 per 
cent in 2011. Only, Khatlon province seems did well (see Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 
Shares of individual territories of Tajikistan on the main industrial indicators (%) 
 Population 
rate 
Industrial 
output 
Industrial 
workers 
Growth (+), decline (-) of shares 
in 1990-2011 (%) 
 
1990 
 
2011 
 
1990 
 
2011 
 
1990 
 
2011 
Population 
rate 
Industrial 
output 
Industrial 
workers 
Tajikistan 100 100 100 100 100 100    
GBAO 3.1 2.6 0.45 0.91 1.3 0.5 –0.5 +0.46 –0.8 
Sughd 30.5 29.4 35.8 30.3 40.4 40 –0.9 –5.5 –0.4 
Khatlon  33.4 35.4 18.4 39.4 15.6 19.7 +2 +11 +4.1 
Dushanbe 11.6 10.4 25.9 11.6 30.0 21.3 –1.2 –14.3 –8.7 
RRS 21.3 22.8 19.5 14.2 12.7 18.3 +1.5 –5.3 +5.6 
Note: The researcher updated 2011 indicators by data retrieved from ASUPRT (2012). 
Source: Khonaliev (2009). 
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Khonaliev (2009) asserts that most of the country’s industries are located 
irrationally. For instance, 89.8 per cent of the fuel and energy complex, and 74.2 
per cent of chemical industry is concentrated in the Khatlon, mining in the Sughd; 
while 94.5 per cent of non-ferrous metallurgy are located in the RRS and 
significant amount of engineering and woodworking industries in Dushanbe (42 
and 79.7 per cents respectively).  
The level of industrialization of a particular province indicates the level of 
income and wellbeing of its inhabitants. In this sense the researcher would 
claimed that the GBAO is the most disadvantaged province in Tajikistan in terms 
of all economic indicators. 
Furthermore, the nature of regional and structural shifts in the industry is 
linked to objective interconnectedness, balance, and proportionality of the all 
factors of regional industrial reproduction to ensure intensive expansion of this 
process (Karimova, 2012). According to Karimova, industrial economics – is a 
complex system, characterized by interconnectedness and integrity of its scopes, 
therefore structural shifts taking place in the industrial sector influences other 
sectors of the economy. This gives a reason to assert that structural changes in the 
industry have positive and negative characters as well. The transformation rate in 
Tajikistan’s industry over the last decade comprised 1.78 per cent per annum, 
while it constitute 0.5 per cent in the developed countries
12
. Tragically, Table 4.5 
                                                 
12
 The higher the rate of disorders of the structural balance, the greater the rate of the 
transformation and the long lasting of its instability. 
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reveals the sharp changes in the speed of transformation of structural changes in 
the country’s industry during the period of 2005 and 2010. 
Table 4.5 
The rate of structural transformation of Tajikistan’s industry (2005-2010, %) 
 Tajikistan GBAO Sughd Khatlon Dushanbe RRS 
Industrial output 7.73 9.37 19.38 15.39 6.93 4.82 
Main funds 6.19 2.31 7.05 1.71 3.9 1.12 
Industrial workers 5.32 5.81 7.87 3.11 5.56 6.49 
Source: Karimova (2012, p. 16). 
Table 4.5 shows that the greatest changes in industrial structure occurred 
in Sughd province and analysis of its speed indicates that the velocity of 
transformation depends on how deep is the industrial crisis. 
4.3.2 Challenges of the Tajikistan industry 
We now categorize the challenges of the Tajikistan industry into two 
levels, one would be internal and another one external. 
According to the GoT (2004), the collapse of the USSR had left serious 
problems to the Tajikistan industry including: lack of financing of the state owned 
enterprises; high level of outdated technology and production equipment; 
uncompetitiveness of produced product; unattractiveness of the national economy 
to foreign direct investments (FDI); lack of qualified specialists in the industry; 
unoccupied nature of the local market with local producers; lack of scientific 
personnel in the industry related research institutions; and low level of labor 
wages. The final reason is the main problem. To the question of “Are there any 
jobs in Tajikistan?” we found an answer in Asia Plus (2013) that there are indeed 
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jobs in Tajikistan, but the problem is low wages. This causes economically active 
population to migrate mostly to Russia wherein the average labor wage is 10 
times higher than in Tajikistan. The average salary in Tajikistan is equal to 60-70 
euros. Next is the shortage of the electricity in winter seasons. According to the 
GoT (2004) almost 70 per cent of the county’s economy is being left with no 
electricity during this season, which annually brings 3 per cent loses of the 
country’s GDP. 
As for the external challenges of the Tajikistan industry, the researcher 
considers the following factors: liberalization of trade regimes and abolishment of 
import restrictions, subsequent membership to the WTO and alignment to its 
requirements. This raises the issues of competitiveness amongst participants of 
foreign economic activities and fueling the national economy with increasing 
output of the domestic industry. Furthermore, incomplete regional integration 
with the CIS countries that contributes to infrastructural obstacles as well as the 
presence of economic giants such as China in the neighborhood bares the issue of 
competitiveness in the frontiers (GoT, 2004). 
4.4 Tajikistan’s industrial policy: in search of similarities with the HPAEs 
During the reign of the USSR Tajikistan used to experience the Marxist 
model of economic development. The sectoral industrial development had been 
established on the state ownership principles, wherein industrial manufacturing, 
investments and means of production had been subjected to central regulation. 
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Moreover, the state monopoly in each sector of the economy and its regulation 
over the market mechanism had been pervasive (Khonaliev, 2009).  
Nevertheless, the adoption of the “Medium-term economic adjustment and 
reform program” in 1998 under the World Bank’s and the IMF’s reformative 
programs is a major proof that the country had shifted to the track of the 
neoclassical model of economic development. For instance, the GoT began to 
liberalize trade, removed informal restrictions on foreign exchange deposit 
withdrawals from the NBT, and modified customs tariffs regime in line with the 
WTO recommendations (IMF, 1999). 
Tajikistan as a participant of the Paris Declaration in its National 
Development Strategy for 2005-2015 (NDG) and subsequent Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers has evidently prioritized the development of its industrial sector 
(NDG, 2005). The GoT preferred to develop its industry based on the neoclassical 
interpretation. It motivated and encouraged the private sector through undertaking 
privatization and providing respective fiscal preferences. 
In support to the concept of privatization in Tajikistan, Hakimov (2004) 
claims that in the transformational period wherein the crisis is reigning, private 
entrepreneurship presents an innovative form of boosting national industry. 
Meanwhile, Mekhtan (2008a) disproves Hakimov’s argument claiming that until 
2008, 95 per cent of the 1,800 small-scaled and medium and large-scaled 
enterprises had been privatized and only 68 per cent had the functioning status. 
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An interesting point is that among those privatized enterprises except 
small - scaled industrial enterprises the medium and large ones faced failure 
(Mekhtan, 2008a). For instance, as of April 2014 out of 1100 privatized medium 
and large scaled industrial enterprises 328 enterprises had no functioning status. 
Besides, in 2013 out of 90 denominations of most important products that were 
produced locally (see Appendix A2) only 35 of them had increased their volume. 
The rest 40 and 15 denominations respectively had no sense of increase and 
production at all (Avesta.Tj, 2014).  
The remaining 5 per cent (or 69 energy and industry related state owned 
enterprises and research institutions) of unprivatized large scaled enterprises are 
functioning under the supervision of the GoT (GoT, 2006). Figure 4.5 shows the 
proportion of nongovernmental industrial sector in the country. 
 
Figure 4.5 The proportion of nongovernmental industrial sector in Tajikistan 
(percentage) 
Source: ASUPRT (2012b). 
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Having transferred such lion’s share of its industry to the private sector 
within short time-span, the country owes to the conducted structural adjustment 
program mentioned at the beginning of this section. If Mekhtan’s (2008a) 
assertion is the outcome of the conducted reforms, then it is right time to question 
the neoclassical orthodox. Its adherents neither in the case of the HPAEs nor in 
Tajikistan provided clear mechanisms of how the formers did conduct or latter 
supposed to conduct such sort of decentralization successfully. Although, the 
revisionists (Statists and Institutionalists) had not explained respected 
mechanisms in the case of HPAEs, to some extent they acknowledged the 
business systems and policy linkages employed in the countries concerned (see 
sections 2.2 and 2.3). Hence, if Tajikistan would have set up such conditions 
while implementing privatizations it could have performed much better. 
While drawing a clear picture of the shrinking state participation in the 
country’s industrial sector (see Figure 4.5) and its obligations before the WTO13, 
the researcher does not exclude the possibility to set up bureau-pluralistic 
collusion between respective state agencies and industries being further privatized. 
According to Suzuki (2013) who agrees with Johnson’s (1982) proposal the 
bureau-pluralistic collusions had served to identify competitive industries and led 
them up to the certain level of prosperity in Japan. Back to the main point, while 
taking into account the nature of the remaining state owned enterprises
14
 the 
                                                 
13
 Tajikistan’s obligations before the WTO are decreasing the space for the state to be active in the 
economic life of the country. This will be discussed in chapter five. 
14
  Here we refer to Mekhtan’s (2008a) and GoT’s (2006) provided definition of large scaled 
energy and industrial enterprises and research institutions. 
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researcher asserts that being privatized under this condition they would have 
become competitive and comparably could have performed better.  
In describing the chief problem of Tajikistan’s export, the GoT (2006) 
claims that it is dominated by the export of raw materials and primary products, 
particularly 83 per cent of it is made up of primary aluminum (75 per cent) and 
ginned cotton (8 per cent). Having this scenario as a case it is the best opportunity 
to argue the Neoclassicals’ proposal per se the HPAEs allegedly squeezed 
maximum profits based on their comparative advantages (see section 2.1). 
Consequently, if this is the way Tajikistan is squeezing its profits then there is no 
point for making further commitments. Fortunately, this is not the end of the story. 
According to Mekhtan (2008b) to overcome the country’s trade imbalance, the 
GoT started to emphasize on diversification of its export potential through 
processing of these particular materials until the end products within the country.  
In particular, the GoT adopted the “Program of Development of the Light 
Industry in the Republic of Tajikistan for the period of 2006-2015”. The program 
provides establishment of cottage industries in the regions with abundant natural 
recourses. This enables the state to reduce the gap of irrational settlement of the 
country’s light industry. Moreover, in order to reduce the transportation cost of 
the ginneries and to encourage further value chain of the cotton in the country the 
program implies establishment of new ginneries adjoin to the cotton fields. It also 
provides fiscal incentives, such as doing away with sales tax and value added tax 
(VAT) on production of cotton and cotton made products (GoT, 2006). 
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With regards to the Tajik aluminum sector, which makes up 1.6 per cent of 
its world production, which is fully under state control, the GoT (2007) has set out 
certain objectives to enhance the capacity of the aluminum processing industry 
and production of competitive finished aluminum goods. To protect them from 
over-imports the GoT provides preferential bank loans and takes special anti-
dumping and countervailing measures. 
In addition to these measures, the state is assisting to establish new value 
chains of aluminum goods within the country, which could potentially substitute 
their imported analogues. The program also implies the creation of permanent 
councils comprising public and private aluminum manufacturers. These councils 
are supposed to be empowered to analyze the world market and provide domestic 
producers with necessary information about the demand in the world market, 
organize promotion and protection of the producers of local aluminum goods 
abroad (GoT, 2007).  
The undertaken paces imply that to some extent the GoT contrary to the 
neoclassical principles is employing industrial policies. However, in search of 
similarities with the HPAEs it seems the state draws its attention more on 
aluminum and cotton industries. This implies for “picking the winners up 
strategies” practiced per se in Korea and Taiwan (see section 2.2). If so, to 
succeed this strategy deriving some positive lessons from the study carried out by 
Natsuda and Thoburn (2014) on the possibility to use such policies within the 
WTO regime is the right approach. 
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The chief document that reflects the state’s policy in support of overall 
industry in the country, is the “Program of the Development of Export of the 
Republic of Tajikistan for the period of until 2015” (PDERT). The PDERT was 
designed to establish mechanisms of provision of financial, fiscal, information-
consultative, marketing and other types of governmental assistance to the local 
exporters. Besides, with taking into account the country’s potential to develop an 
advanced and competitive industry, the program gives priority to the exports 
based on the country’s comparative advantages with emphasize on their value 
chains. 
The PDERT has three stages of implementation. The first is the 
“Establishment of institutional and organizational fundamentals, which boost 
exports (2006-2008)”. The second is “Energizing of exports and transition to 
diversified exports (2009-2011)”. The third stage is “Diversification of exports 
and radical modification of its structure (2012-2015)”. To achieve all these targets, 
the PDERT proposes a set of measures to be undertaken, including: establishment 
of the National Commission on Promotion of Exports at the GoT; establishment 
of Republican Association of Exporters (comprised of exporters, investors and 
respective government agencies’ representatives); and formation of Innovation 
Fund of Export Development.  
Although, these bodies have their own commonalities with those of 
effectively performed respective committees and councils in the HPAEs (see 
section 2.3) due to unclear sources of financing some of them have not been 
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emerged. Hopefully, there is an active nongovernmental institution that has some 
similarities compliant to those of in the HPAEs even with broader scope of 
responsibilities. For instance, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Tajikistan (CCIT) is empowered to take part in the country’s economic integration 
into the global economy, through unification of private entrepreneurs and 
enterprises (domestic and foreign), trade and industry related associations and 
respected government bodies
15
 (Charter of CCIT, n.d.). 
According to CCIT’s Charter (n.d.) it has been vested with responsibilities 
to set up scientific-technical links with foreign countries that could boost private 
entrepreneurship in the country. Then the researcher may raise an argument that 
having almost no scientific institutions in its membership (CCIT, 2014) and no 
representatives of science in its Council
16
, the absorption of local scientific 
achievements by national firms seems impossible. Even the process of how this 
institution sets up international scientific linkages is undermined.  
Nevertheless, in order to reach the study’s objectives it would be ideal to 
answer the following question. 
4.4.1 What Tajikistan’s political economy looks like? (Perspectives of 
the Neoclassical and Revisionist theories). 
In the beginning of the section 4.4 the researcher stressed that since the 
                                                 
15
 According to CCIT (2014), as of January, 2014 CCIT had 598 members representing different 
scopes of the country’s economy. 
16
 This was the case in the HPAEs (see section 2.3). 
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independence Tajikistan changed its political economy giving more emphasis to 
the market based approach. It must be understood that in the current world 
economic system small economies like the one of Tajikistan’s have less options to 
which policy to adhere. This usually happens despite being aware that the sole 
proposed policy option might be harmful in the long-run. Therefore, in the 1990’s 
being politically, economically and financially disadvantaged the country had no 
choice but rather to turn to the IFI’s including the World Bank and the IMF. It is 
obvious that the latters in turn put their own conditions (based on neoclassical 
interpretations) into force (see Chapter Three). 
As mentioned earlier in order to meet those conditions Tajikistan 
conducted several economic reforms that were designed based on the neoclassical 
theory’s interpretations. This includes privatization of industrial enterprises, 
liberalization of the country’s trade and financial regimes 17  and the 
implementation of other decentralizing measures that to a significant extent 
abolished the state’s options to regulate market.  
However, it would be of greatest mistakes if one claims that Tajikistan’s 
political economy is fully compliant to the neoclassical theory’s interpretations. 
This is mostly because the state still takes active participation in economic life of 
the country. Although, it has privatized significant number of industrial 
enterprises, it possesses and holds decisive shares of big energy and industrial 
enterprises (see Figure 4.5). Another instance is that although in a less amount the 
                                                 
17
 These issues will be subject to detailed discussions in Chapter Five. 
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state provides subsidies to the state owned industrial enterprises
18
.  
As the researcher has found in the GoT (2007) and Turaeva (2012) the 
state also practices anti-dumping and countervailing measures and provides 
preferential loans favoring aluminum and cotton industries. Speaking of cotton, 
before the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 the prices for this product reached 
their peak in the world market. Hence, it made its exports in the raw form much 
more profitable rather than its realization in the domestic market. Consequently, 
shortages of raw cotton in the domestic market interrupted the local manufacturers’ 
businesses and decreased the state budget’s revenues from the direct taxes. This 
caused the Ministry of Energy and Industry of the RT to come up with a proposal 
to the GoT to impose quantitative restrictions on exports of raw cotton (Turaeva, 
2012).  Generally speaking, from these perspectives it is quite safe to claim that 
despite taking neoclassical course, Tajikistan’s political economy does not fully 
match to those of the neoclassical theory’s interpretations on the HPAEs’ success. 
The researcher would also assert that the country’s political economy is 
also inconsistent with the interpretations made by the revisionists on the HPAEs’ 
industrial success. There are several reasons that the researcher stands for this 
point. 
The first and most important is the country’s growing adherence to the 
neoclassical model of economic development. Financial and trade liberalization 
are not features appropriate to the revisionists interpretations in the HPAEs. As it 
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 Information about state subsidies will be provided in the following chapter. 
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is stipulated in the sections 2.2 and 2.3 particularly financial and trade sectors, the 
main components and tools of employing industrial policies in the HPAEs were 
under strict government control. For instance, due to quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions on imports and providing preferential loans, the HPAEs were able to 
conduct the “Picking the winners” strategies. Even though some GoT’s actions 
are in favor of cotton and aluminum industries and quite similar to the “Picking 
the winner” strategies employed in the HPAEs; these similarities are undermined 
due to the undergoing liberalizations in the country. The fact that 83 per cent of 
Tajikistan’s exports are comprised of export of aluminum and cotton does not 
necessary stand in support to the use of the “Picking the winners” strategy. This is 
because by conducting such strategies particularly Japan and Korea were able to 
establish big industrial and financial businesses (conglomerates) such as Keiretsu 
and Chaebols. However, in the case of Tajikistan there are no such big diversified 
business groups. 
The second reason is an existence of the state-owned industrial enterprises 
in Tajikistan. Here, the issue is that the revisionists did not claim that the HPAEs 
possessed industrial enterprises, rather there were private enterprises, but with the 
states guiding their economic decisions
19
. Besides, contrary to the Institutionalists, 
there is no policy linkages between the GoT and already privatized enterprises. Or 
in other words there is no binding obligations before the enterprises so that the 
GoT could guide their economic decisions. 
                                                 
19
 Economic decision-making is the only factor that divides the revisionists into two groups: the 
Statists and Institutionalists (see Table 2.1). 
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The third reason is probably relevant to the previous one. It touches on 
issues concerning the absence of “Institutional framework” in Tajikistan. 
Although, it has been mentioned (see section 4.4) that the CCIT has the similar 
responsibilities like those of Deliberation Councils’, it however lacks important 
forcing tool. This implies that the CCIT is a nongovernmental organization; hence 
it does not have the authority, for example, to impose any obligations on its 
members (private entrepreneurs or enterprises) and any public entity. Lacking in 
such regulatory tool the CCIT is just a platform for sharing with information. 
Therefore, from this stance Tajikistan does not match with revisionists’ 
interpretation’s on the HPAEs’ industrial success as well.  
In sum, a comparative analysis of Tajikistan’s political economy with 
those of the Neoclassicals’ and Revisionists’ (Statists and Institutionalists) 
interpretations on the HPAEs’ political economies revealed that Tajikistan is not 
fully compliant with at least one of them. It seems rather the GoT’s economic 
policies partially meet the Neoclassicals’ interpretations. However, some other 
indicators match those of the revisionists’ interpretations simultaneously or vice 
versa. 
Nevertheless, whatever the economic and industrial situation Tajikistan is 
currently facing, it is just a matter of fact that it is moving rather towards open 
market economy. The sole and firm evidence for this statement is that the country 
has joined the WTO. Hence, it would be ideal to look into the industrial 
standpoints of the country’s integration to the WTO per se what policy tools has 
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been preserved by the GoT before the WTO and what has been abandoned. The 
following section sheds light onto these issues.  
  61 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5. TAJIKISTAN’s INTEGRATION TO THE WTO: INDUSTRY 
RELATED REFORMS 
This chapter analyses the industrial standpoints of Tajikistan’s integration 
into the WTO per se the country’s alignment to the TRIMs, GATS, SCMs and 
TRIPs. It also identifies the scope to emulate the HPAEs’ industrial experience for 
Tajikistan within the analyzed regime. 
On December 2012, Tajikistan has been accepted to the WTO membership 
and it took eleven years to comply its legal base with the WTO requirements. 
According to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic 
of Tajikistan (MEDT) there have been more than 92 socio-economic legislative 
acts adopted and amended. Moreover, being a country with transitional economy 
it has retained the status of developing country before the WTO (MEDT, 2014). 
5.1 TRIMs and GATS 
In Tajikistan, both foreign and local investors have the same classification 
that is “investors”. This is because of recently adopted Law “On Investments” 
(2007) which is the outcome of the GoT’s efforts to become a WTO member. The 
most important difference of this Law from its antecedent Law (1992) is that it 
provides for both local and foreign investors equal rights with no discrimination 
(SCIMSP & UNDP, 2012). The previous Law “About Foreign Investment in RT” 
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(1992) contained performance requirements, which are banned by the TRIMs. For 
example, foreign company willing to open its affiliate in Tajikistan was obliged to 
hire 70 per cent of its personnel locally. 
Although, current Law “On Investment” (2007) abolished such 
requirements, some of them have been preserved for foreign companies 
participating in explorations and mining operations on the Tajik territory. 
Furthermore, the GoT used to conduct a “preliminary expert revision” of huge 
investment projects with a foreign capital participation. It also required “scientific 
expertize” of economic feasibility and technically innovative component of the 
new enterprises being established. Nevertheless, the respected Presidential Decree 
has diminished these requirements (SCIMSP & UNDP, 2012). 
Until recently export activities in Tajikistan have been subject to strict 
control. Exporters were obliged to repatriate all financial means gained from 
exports of goods and services to their domestic accounts in Tajikistan. Moreover, 
exports of main exporting products (copper, fermented tobacco, aluminum and its 
products, cotton and its products, minerals, chemicals etc.) that constitute 2/3 of 
the country’s exports required full prepayment. These conditions were applied to 
stabilize the country’s trade turnover and to ensure permanent inflow of the 
foreign exchange. Nevertheless, these requirements have been questioned by the 
WTO members and in turn, abolished by Tajik authorities (WTO, 2012). 
Concerning privatization, either foreign and local companies or 
individuals have equal rights to participate in the privatization of state property. 
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However, when it comes to industry or service related object, before privatizing 
its property the government puts forth compulsory obligations (related to the 
improvement) to be met within first 2-3 years. In case those obligations are not 
met, the GoT receives the rights to return the sold object (Law of the RT, 1997a, 
#464). However, objects like water supply system and irrigation infrastructure, 
hydropower plants, aluminum factories, scientific and experimental-industrial 
enterprises of Academy of Science of the country, postal companies, television 
and radio broadcasting centers are not subject to privatization (GoT, 2009). 
According to Law of the RT “On Banking Activity” (2009, #524), foreign 
banks and their affiliates are allowed to provide banking services on the Tajik 
territory and granted with legal rights equal to those of locals’. NBT used to set up 
the ceiling for foreign capital component in the established foreign bank’s 
branches and controlled the increase in their authorized capital and provision of 
special capital. However, in order to establish a fair competitive environment 
compliant with the GATS requirements this Law abolished the use of such 
monetary policy. Currently the banking sector has 15 banks, 2 foreign affiliates 
and 119 microfinance institutions operating in Tajikistan (NBT, 2014). 
The next issue of the study’s concern is “Investment incentives”. They are 
taken in the form of tax and customs duty exemption and provisioned in the Tax 
Code of RT (2012, Article 211) and Customs Code of RT (2004, Article 345). 
Consequently, no matter what source of capital they have and depending on their 
capacities, the new industrial enterprises being established in Tajikistan will be 
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granted with VAT exemption during first 2-5 years (Tax Code of RT 2012, 
Article 145).  
Yet from the perspective of industrial policy, such combination of 
incentive provision on national level has bound the GoT’s hands from using them 
as a policy tool to encourage industrial activities in the desired scopes of the 
economy. 
5.2 SCMs 
Tajik authorities assert that Tajikistan has undertaken such an industrial 
policy that provides no protection to any economic activity within its territory. 
Neither government nor its bodies provide direct or indirect subsidies to the 
exporters and seemingly they are not even planning to have one. Moreover, 
according to the authorities, the country’s legal base is fully consistent with the 
SCMs requirements (WTO, 2012). However, in respective articles of the Tax and 
the Customs codes (as mentioned before) this study has determined that industrial 
sector can enjoy the tax and customs incentives for a certain period of time. This 
in turn could possibly lead to the export growth, hence being disputed by the 
WTO members. 
To disprove this allegation, Tajik representative to the WTO claims that 
these incentives have nothing to do with the accomplishment of government 
export requirements, thus they are not subject to disputes before the WTO. 
Although it is an insignificant amount, under the same principle, the GoT 
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subsidizes the state-owned enterprises operating in mining, oil discovering, and 
chemical and aluminum industries. Today, the latter is a locomotive of the Tajik 
industry and exports (MEDT, 2014).  
Therefore, based on the mentioned principals, Talco (aluminum producing 
factory) receives a bunch of government support. For instance, the GoT freed the 
factory from paying VAT for the imports of raw materials, energy supply and 
equipment. It has been also granted with discounts on electricity supply prices and 
customs duties. Moreover, sales in locally produced primary aluminum alongside 
with cotton (no matter in local or foreign markets) have been exempted from 
paying VAT against imported analogues. The WTO members have argued 
provision of such incentives to the locals and requested Tajikistan to establish 
equal tax levels for goods produced locally and abroad with no discrimination. In 
turn Tajikistan has responded positively (WTO, 2012).  
As specified by the GoT (1999, #131) and Law of the RT (1997b, #451), 
Tajikistan used to impose quantitative restrictions on imports of ethyl alcohol and 
spirits in order to protect and maintain its local production. However, the WTO 
commission to Tajikistan claimed that such an ISI policy has no legal base and 
inconsistent with the WTO requirement, hence ought to be omitted. In 2012 these 
import restrictions have been abolished with Presidential Decree #1270. 
Government procurement – until 2006 the government bodies had the 
right to pick up suppliers of goods and services amongst those of locals to 
accomplish the procurement. If for example, there were sufficient local candidates 
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applied to accomplish the proposed procurements, or if procurements were being 
accomplished within Tajikistan’s territory then the procuring entity would give 
the priority to the domestic suppliers with condition to utilize domestic resources 
(Law of the RT, 1997c, #511). Yet the new Law on procurement has abolished 
this regulation in compliance to the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Hence, it motivates and encourages competitive 
participation of both domestic and foreign suppliers through provision of equal 
rights with no discrimination clause (Law of the RT, 2006, #168).  
However, taking into account uncompetitiveness of the domestic 
enterprises before those of abroad, motivation and encouragement of the domestic 
enterprises to participate in the tenders is under question.   
5.3 TRIPs 
All WTO members are obliged to set forth the minimum level of 
protection of the IPRs, hence being a participant of the TRIPs agreement means 
that “…Tajikistan is required to have effective legislation in place to secure such 
level of protection” (International Trade Center, 2013, p. 9). In this perspective, 
analysis of Tajik legal base reveals that state protection of the IPRs is 
contemplated starting from the country’s Constitution (Article 40) to respective 
laws and the GoT’s decrees. Beside the TRIPs, the country is participating in 
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several international and regional agreements and conventions that define globally 
the position of the IPRs and industrial property rights per se
20
.  
Therefore, almost all of the components of the TRIPs, including: 
trademarks; industrial designs; copyrights; geographical indications; patents and 
trade secrets have met the level of required protection in Tajikistan. However, the 
researcher found it worthy to mentioned that Law of the RT “On Inventions” 
(2004, #17) which does not recognize algorithms and computer software as an 
invention, hence they are ineligible to be protected by patents. Having such an 
opportunity neither domestic companies nor foreign companies are willing to 
make their business in this field. 
5.4 Emulations of the HPAEs’ Industrial Policies for Tajikistan: possible or 
impossible? 
The developing community has been anticipated to emulate a proper 
model of the HPAEs’ industrial development to follow (Lall, 1994). For sure, this 
study has been pursuing the same objective, but specifically for Tajikistan’s 
industry. Therefore, being familiar with the country’s obligations before the WTO 
makes the study’s task easier when it comes to finding out what particular strategy 
is still viable and what is impossible to derive to. 
While conducting theoretical analysis the study has come across the sole 
consensus between employed theories (see section 2.1), that they did not deny the 
                                                 
20
 For more information about country’s participation to the international conventions and 
agreements regulating intellectual property rights please refer to the WTO (2012, pp.106-107). 
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use of the ISI strategy in the HPAEs. The researcher asserts that the ISI laid firm 
underpinnings for overall industries in the respected HPAEs to be competitively 
ready for the openness (see Chapter Two). However, in spite of existing 
consensus, today, under the SCMs it is impossible for Tajikistan to emulate the 
concerned strategy. Though it is already taking some measures inconsistent to the 
SCMs and close to the HPAEs experiences (see section 5.2). 
Our further concern is whether Tajikistan can enjoy the use of policy loans 
directed to the targeted industries or not? In other words can the GoT practice 
pick up interventions or not, as it was the case in Korea (see section 2.1)? 
Generally speaking targeting industrialization is restricted by the GATS, yet 
Natsuda and Thoburn (2014) have found the loophole to bypass it. Despite this, 
taking into account the country’s financial system (see section 5.1) and financial 
ability the answer is no, as Tajikistan is incapable to use massive policy loans. 
Now, speaking of provision of fiscal incentives, it does not depend on the GoT, as 
its equal provision has been endorsed in upper instance legislation. In a nutshell, 
the GoT’s hands are tied (see section 5.1). 
“[T]o decide what, when, and how much to produce which strategic 
industry to favour” (Amsden, 1989, pp. 8-12) through the use of subsidies (see 
section 2.2) seems to be also inconsistent with the SCMs requirements, but we 
have been witnessing that the GoT although in less amount have been practicing 
them. However, practicing subsidies does not mean that the GoT uses the exact 
way some HPAEs used to, per se dual strategies. Hence, if the country is 
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somehow maneuvering within the SCMs’ regulations it has an opportunity to get 
familiar with this strategy. At least this strategy could be imposed on the state 
owned enterprises. 
Furthermore, if to follow Greschenkron’s (1962) and Amsden’s (1989) 
assertion, particularly their argument on the HPAEs (see section 2.2), then 
Tajikistan’s full compliance to the TRIPs excludes the opportunity to develop by 
learning (it was the case in the HPAEs) rather by inventing or contributing to 
innovations. 
Besides, if we dare to answer the frequently asked question whether or not 
compliance with the TRIPs will increase the inflow of FDI? In the case of 
Tajikistan the researcher shall refer to the statement made in SCIMSP and UNDP 
(2012). It says, attraction of foreign capital into Tajik economy have not yet 
established massive and sound investment sector and for this stage of 
development of investment activity weak national technology park is peculiar. 
The researcher is inclined to believe that the only interpretation of the 
HPAEs’ industrial development that is up to date compliant with all the industry 
related WTO agreements is that of Institutionalists’ (see section 2.3). Therefore, it 
is possible for Tajikistan to derive some positive implications from Weiss (1995) 
and Evans (1995).  
Notwithstanding, whether the WTO membership for Tajikistan is 
beneficial or disadvantageous is a sensible question. Evidence from Kyrgyz 
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Republic, the first Central Asian state that has been accepted to the WTO in 1998 
is not vigorous (Pomfret, 2007). However, Tajik authorities are positive about 
Tajikistan’s accession into the WTO. They assert that Tajik goods and services 
will attain access to the world market (International Trade Center, 2013). 
The subsequent chapter wraps up the entire study and provides some 
policy recommendations and suggestions for further studies. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter concludes the entire study by employing the extracted 
essence that appropriately responds to its objectives and questions (see sections 
1.3 and 1.4). 
6.1 Conclusion 
Although an opportunity to emulate the HPAEs’ industrial development is 
narrowed down by the WTO’s regulations, Tajikistan still has plenty of legal 
room to employ those practices. To underpin its main argument this study sought 
to determine the sole recipe for the HPAEs industrial development and investigate 
the changes that the WTO has brought into the world’s political economy. The 
study also described the current economic and industrial state in Tajikistan and 
analyzed the country’s political economy for its resemblances with those of the 
HPAEs’. Afterwards, it searched for available space for the GoT to employ the 
retrieved lessons from the HPAEs’ industrial development experiences within the 
WTO’s regulations. 
In fact, the HPAEs had successfully chosen the right path in heading 
towards economic and industrial prosperity so that further the way they did it 
become a subject of imitation amongst developing countries. With the purpose to 
demonstrate a coherent explanation of their industrial success, this section is an 
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attempt to address the question of “why the HPAEs’ economic out-performance 
gained the title of miracle?” 
Based on reviewed literature the study found that the HPAEs’ economic 
and industrial prosperity has been interpreted by the three different orthodoxies 
per se the Neoclassicals, Statists and Institutionalists. The study determined that 
the main subject of debates between these theories is about roles of the states 
played in the economic life of the HPAEs. This implies that the economic out-
performance of the HPAEs occurred whether due to the laissez faire market 
principals or the pervasiveness of the states. 
Relying on its findings the study elaborated an argument that the HPAEs’ 
miracle was entitled to it due to the eagerness of the states to achieve their 
economic and industrial targets. These achievements were made possible because 
of the well-integrated chain of the states’ industrial policies, which occupied 
spheres such as: (1) financial sector; (2) trade sector; (3) the IPRs; (4) the most 
important influencing the business’ decision making, and others. For example, it 
would be hard to imagine the emergence of Japanese Keiretsu and Korean 
Chaebols without preferential loans, the ISI and export oriented strategies 
provisioned by the states, while the laissez faire economy prohibits the state in 
question to conduct such policies (see sections 2.1; 2.2).  
Contrary to the Neoclassicals, the Revisionists provided historical 
evidence that the HPAEs had developed their industries as a group of 
“Latecomers”, wherein the states played a vital role in borrowing inventions of 
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advanced countries rather than making them on their own (see section 2.2). The 
fact that the Neoclassicals themselves recognized that Korean and Taiwanese 
states were favoring some industries gives extra credits to the Revisionists and 
brings the validity of the former’s assertion under doubt (see section 2.1).  
Generally speaking the study has found more pros rather than cons in 
favor of the Revisionists’ interpretations about the HPAEs economic and 
industrial development. In a nutshell, the economic out-performances had been 
achieved because of the active participation of the HPAEs’ states in their 
economic decision making processes. 
However, since the 1990s the HPAEs embarked on neoclassical reforms 
that liberalized financial and trade sectors and aligned their political economies to 
the requirements of the neoclassical-based international institutions, such as the 
WTO, the World Bank and the IMF. Consequently, these events caused the 
neoclassical theory to become more robust from one side and gradually 
diminished the states power from another.  
The following answers the question of “how the world of political 
economy has changed with the emergence of the WTO?” 
The WTO has emerged as part of the augmented “Washington Consensus”. 
The latter just before the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 with its neoliberal 
reforms had already been diminishing the dirigisme in Latin American region. 
Besides, the study has shown that until the 1990s the HPAEs have been practicing 
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industrial policies (see Chapter 2). Hence, the main concerns in the world 
particularly in developing countries evolved in respect to changes in rules of 
international political economy that the WTO has brought into. In particular the 
main concerns are about the use of industrial policies that might favor domestic 
producers
21
.   
Therefore, based on its findings this study argues that for those that are 
considered late
22
, the accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations
23
 had limited the space for their states to maneuver in order to 
implement industrial policies. The study backs up its argument on analysis of the 
four WTO agreements per se including TRIPs, TRIMs, SCMs and GATS. It has 
revealed that these agreements are very reluctant to the use of industrial policies 
within the WTO member countries. For instance, protections of the IPRs under 
the TRIPs have limited any WTO member states’ ability to utilize patented 
product or technology, which was the case in the HPAEs (see section 2.2). 
Speaking of the TRIMs its ban on “performance requirements” has swept away 
the idea of protecting an infant industry, which served as a precondition for the 
development of domestic industries in the HPAEs. In addition to the TRIMs, the 
GATS went beyond and occupied trade in services as well. Another example is 
that the SCMs reduced the state’s ability to employ export-oriented 
industrialization and the ISI strategies basis of which are the governmental 
subsidies and countervailing measures.  
                                                 
21
 For instance, as the research revealed the HPAEs had succeeded with practicing such sort of 
policies.  
22
 This refers to developing countries including Tajikistan. 
23
 This round of negotiations has put fundamentals of the WTO. 
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With its non-discrimination objectives with respect to trade, the WTO and 
its agreements are the main advocates of equality amongst the members. However, 
comparing the diversity of so called comparative advantages of advanced 
countries and backward countries it is hard to believe that such inequality is about 
to be “equalized” within the WTO framework. 
Hereinafter, the researcher concludes the study by backing up the study’s 
main thesis stipulated in the beginning of this chapter and answers the questions 
of “what is the current economic and industrial situation in Tajikistan?” and 
“how much space still exists beyond the WTO regulations in order to imply the 
HPAEs’ industrial experience into Tajikistan’s economy?” 
Tajikistan is a relatively young country and for a short period of its 
independent existence it suffered from several political and economical shocks 
that negatively reflected on the country’s economy and industry per se. The study 
found that the country used to experience Marxist model of economic 
development and possessed comparably advanced industry. However, the collapse 
of the socio-economically integrated system of the USSR in 1991, and attempts 
for transition to the market based economy undermined the progressivity of the 
country’s industry and economy.  
Despite of the fact that the country has converged to some of the pre-
collapse
24
 period’s economic indicators, the study has elaborated an argument that 
Tajikistan’s industry is situated in transformational crisis. In other words it is 
                                                 
24
 The researcher refers to the period of 1991 the year of the breakdown of the USSR. 
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deindustrializing. For instance, the study found that as of 2010 contingent of the 
workers engaged in industrial sector constituted just 30.2 per cent of that of in 
1991. Although the country’s total industrial output has increased as compared in 
1991, this mass production has not been accomplished by renewal of industrial 
machinery and other outdated equipment. This implies that the country’s existing 
industrial capabilities are uncompetitive. Besides, the sector’s contribution to the 
country’s GDP has dropped almost two folds, which once again underpins the 
presented argument. Moreover, an analytical work on determining the structural 
changes within the country’s regions revealed that beside Dushanbe, the capital 
city, almost all regions are experiencing negative structural changes. Because of 
this analysis, now, it is possible to determine country’s disadvantaged regions (see 
section 4.3). 
While analyzing Tajikistan’s political economy from the perspectives of 
the Neoclassicals and Revisionists the study found that the country’s economic 
system belongs to neither of them rather it has cocktail of both explanations. 
Moreover, this mix is added with some Marxist principals particularly state-
ownership, which was not determined in the case of the HPAEs. This is from here 
the study argues that the country’s transition to market based economy is yet to be 
fulfilled. If such cocktail of economic policies had faced success in Tajikistan, 
then the researcher could have coined relatively new approach of economic 
development. 
In respect to the last research question the study claims that in the WTO 
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era it is practically impossible to emulate overall HPAEs’ industrial policies into 
Tajikistan’s economy and elsewhere in developing WTO member countries. 
However, it has found that Tajikistan still have the space to maneuver. The 
existing policy options are presented in the form of policy recommendations in 
the following section. 
6.2 Recommendations 
Based on the results of the conducted study, the researcher proposes the 
following policy recommendation.  
First, in taking into account the country’s negative balance of payment and 
to overcome the challenges availing its negative development, it is necessary for 
the GoT to take measures encouraging industrial activities and promoting value 
chain of the existing industries throughout the country’s disadvantaged regions by 
employing Shafaeddin’s (2006) proposal (see section 3.3).  
Second, although it depends on the level of the country’s attractiveness to 
FDI
25
, the researcher suggests that the GoT, with full compliance to the country’s 
national treatment, set out the requirements for the foreign firms operating in 
Tajikistan to make technology transfer and conduct R&D using local scientific 
personnel (see section 3.3). 
Third, as the state preserved R&D institutions on its own balance of 
property, the researcher recommends that the GoT improve its financing scheme 
                                                 
25
  This is asserted by the UNCTAD (2006). Please refer to the section 3.3. 
  78 
by utilizing “picking the winners up” strategy. This would allow scientific 
institutions to: 1) periodically determine the country’s comparative advantages; 
and 2) work towards improvement of the defined comparative advantages. 
Furthermore, the GoT would reach its objective to develop its own “National 
Innovation System” if it encourages establishment of independent R&D 
institutions through the implication of mechanisms prescribed in the country’s 
Law “On Innovation Activity”. 
Although, the HPAEs had different business structures and definitely 
different from that of Tajikistan’s, they had had policy linkages similar to the 
Japanese Deliberation councils. This received best support from Chui and Lui 
(1998), Johnson (1997), Wiess (1995) and Evans (1995). Therefore the fifth 
recommendation is for the GoT to squeeze maximum positives from the strategy 
of “Embedded Autonomy” (see section 2.3) and set up state-business 
interconnectedness. Currently, none of the international organizations could stop 
any government to create active platform where both public and private sectors 
could gain their objectives through establishing a constructive communication and 
sharing of necessary information. A wonderful example would be enhanced 
activities towards establishment and empowering with greater authority of such 
bodies as stipulated in section 4.4. 
Lastly, for countries like Tajikistan the use of Natsuda’s and Thoburn’s 
(2013) suggestions that developing counties having GDP per capita below USD 
1000 are exempted to follow prohibition of the SCMs, would be a temporary 
remedy. Why it is temporary? because, once the country’s per capita GDP goes up 
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beyond USD 1000, the use of government subsidies directed to export promotion 
and import substitution would be impossible. 
6.3 Further Studies 
This study is the first contribution to the development of the Tajikistan’s 
industry, which strived to find out the space for policy intervention in order to 
implicate exemplar experiences of the East Asian countries within the WTO 
regime. Although this thesis has its own limitations, it has reached to significant 
and pertinent conclusion that encompassed the scope of the study and the GoT’s 
development objectives. However, in order to extend the scope of the study and 
repudiate admitted limitations, future studies should focus on: (1) conducting field 
surveys of individual sectors of Tajikistan’s industry that encompass practical 
opinions of business with regards to the pros and cons of the WTO membership; 
and, (2) seeking opportunities to derive lessons from industrial development 
experiences of other WTO members, including leading European countries. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A1 
Trends of Selected Development Indicators of Tajikistan 
Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Population total 
(million) 
 
6.4 6.5 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.8 8 
Population  growth 
(annual %) 
 
1.8 1.94 2.03 2.1 2.16 2.22 2.28 2.33 2.38 2.42 2.45 
Life expectancy at 
birth, total (years) 
 
64.4 64.8 65.2 65.6 65.9 66.3 66.6 66.9 67.2 67.5 -- 
GNI per capita, 
PPP (current 
international $) 
 
1,020 1,120 1,270 1,37
0 
1,480 1,63
0 
1,78
0 
1,820 1,92
0 
2,06
0 
2,22
0 
GDP (current US$, 
million) 
 
1,221 1,554 2,078 2,31
2 
2,830 3,71
9 
5,16
1 
4,978 5,64
1 
6,52
2 
6,98
6 
GDP growh 
(annual %) 
 
10.8 11 10.3 6.7 7 8 8 3.9 6.5 7.4 8 
GDP per capita 
(current US$) 
190.6 238 311.5 339.
4 
406.9 523.
6 
709.
4 
668.4 739.
6 
834.
5 
872.
3 
Source: World Bank (2013b). 
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APPENDIX A2 
Production of the main industrial products in Tajikistan for the period of 2005-2011 
Name of product 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Power transformators (thousand kVA) 63,7 22,5 30,6 27,9 19,0 14,0 11,2 
Electricity (billion kWh) 17,1 16,9 17,5 16,1 16,1 16,4 16,4 
Cable products by weight of copper 3,5 2,7 3,6 3,6 0,4 - - 
Buses “LAZ” (pcs.) 2 4 3 2 - - - 
Restaurant cookers (pcs.) 108 131 142 157 125 41 139 
Synthetic ammonia (thousand tons) 53,6 43,8 32 29,6 - - 0,9 
Coal (thousand tons) 98,5 104,6 181,4 198,5 178,3 199,7 236,4 
Oil, including gas condensate, 
(thousand tons) 
21,7 23,7 25,9 25,8 26,2 27 28,3 
Gas (million cubic meter)  29,4 20 17,4 16,1 19,9 22,8 18,5 
Cement (thousand tons) 253,1 281,5 313,1 190,4 195 288,2 299,4 
Wall materials (million pcs.) 45,9 47,1 49,3 49,4 54,7 70,9 57,2 
Cotton (thousand tons) 153,3 134,8 153,2 115,7 92,2 95,2 103,4 
Cotton seeds (thousand tons) 264,9 237 267,2 203,1 159,9 161,6 170,2 
Raw silk yarn (tons) 158,1 77,8 81,7 42,3 27,4 19 22,7 
Cotton yarn (thousand tons) 15,02 14,6 12,7 9,6 8,2 6,1 7,04 
Wool yarn (tons) 470 377 342 100,2 74 101 126 
Cotton fabrics (ten thousand
2 
meter) 24,15 21,1 26,1 27,7 36,5 25,5 21,3 
Silk fabrics (thousand
2 
meter) 3,8 20,2 28,1 60 60 66 66,1 
Carpet productions (thousand
2 
meter) 458,9 626,4 941,7 764,9 548,6 558,2 656,8 
Hosiery (thousand pairs) 5900 6147 6243 5462 5658 5735 6098 
Jerseys (thousand pcs.) 1095 128 112,2 46 37 - 21 
Footwear (thousand pairs) 33,2 29,5 38,4 37,5 30,8 34,8 65,9 
Meat, including offal (thousand tons) 19,5 20,2 21,3 21,7 24,9 27,1 27,6 
Milk production (tons) 4729 3936 5108 3857 3987 4056 4444 
Vegetable oil (thousand tons) 23 20 23,7 17,3 13,1 14,1 15,1 
Meats (tons) 483 537 592 803 820 998 1611 
Animal fat (tons) 88 14 5,4 7,5 18,5 20,9 16,5 
Canned food (million cans) 77,8 95,1 67,2 76,4 83 51 60 
Source: ASUPRT (2012a), “Regions of Tajikistan 2012”. 
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     APPENDIX B1 
Governed interdependence theory (explaining East Asian Development). Adapted 
from “Governed interdependence: rethinking the government-business 
relationship in East Asia,” by Weiss, L., 1995, The Pacific Review, 8, p. 595. 
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Trends of poverty reduction, 1999-2012 
Source: LSIST (2013).  
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     Trends of depreciation of TJS against USD 
Source: NBT (2013a). Compiled by the researcher. 
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